

Beyond
la
Frontera

The History of Mexico—U.S. Migration



Edited by

MARK OVERMYER-VELAZQUEZ
University of Connecticut

New York Oxford

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education.

Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Copyright © 2011 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

For titles covered by Section 112 of the US Higher Education Opportunity Act, please visit www.oup.com/us/fe for the latest information about pricing and alternate formats.

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
www.oup.com

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Beyond la frontera : the history of Mexico-U.S. migration / edited by Mark Overmyer-Velázquez.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-19-538222-8

1. Mexico—Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. 2. Mexico—Emigration and immigration—Government policy—History—20th century. 3. United States—Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. 4. United States—Emigration and immigration—Government policy—History—20th century. 5. Migrant labor—United States—History—20th century. 6. Mexicans—United States—History—20th century. I. Overmyer-Velázquez, Mark.

E184.M5B497 2011

304.873072—dc22

2010042949

Printing number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

*Para mi mamá,
su familia,
y todos los migrantes mexicanos que han cruzado y vivido
más allá de la frontera.*

CONTENTS



FOREWORD *Saskia Sassen*
Weaponized Fences and Novel Borderings: The
Beginning of a New History? ix

PREFACE xv

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES xvii

INTRODUCTION *Mark Overmyer-Velázquez*
Histories and Historiographies of Greater
Mexico xix

PART I
CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORIES

Chapter 1 *Juan Mora-Torres*
“Los de casa se van, los de fuera no vienen”
The First Mexican Immigrants, 1848–1900 3

Chapter 2 *Gilbert G. Gonzalez*
Mexican Labor Migration, 1876–1924 28

Chapter 3 *Fernando Saul Alanís Enciso*
The Repatriation of Mexicans from the United
States and Mexican Nationalism, 1929–1940 51

Chapter 4 *Michael Snodgrass*
The Bracero Program, 1942–1964 70

- Chapter 5 Oscar J. Martinez
Migration and the Border, 1965–1985 103

PART II

COMPARATIVE THEMES

- Chapter 6 Helen B. Marrow
Race and the New Southern Migration,
1986 to the Present 125

- Chapter 7 Jonathan Fox
Indigenous Mexican Migrants 161

- Chapter 8 David FitzGerald
Mexican Migration and the Law 179

- Chapter 9 Eihne Luibheid and Robert Buffington
Gender, Sexuality, and Mexican Migration 204

- Chapter 10 Alex M. Saragoza
Cultural Representation and
Mexican Immigration 227

EPilogue Douglas S. Massey
The Past and Future of Mexico–U.S.
Migration 251

APPENDIX

Chronology of Mexican Migration 267

CONTRIBUTORS 287

BIBLIOGRAPHY 291

INDEX 337

FOREWORD



Weaponized Fences and Novel Borderings

The Beginning of a New History?

Saskia Sassen
Columbia University

One of the outstanding features of this volume is the exceptional breadth of the spaces and the times through which it constructs the Mexico–U.S. history of migrations. A theme that is explicitly or implicitly present is the border—either as an actor or as an absence that makes itself felt as a specter. When I read these chapters I cannot help but see the many different worlds that are called forth by this particular border and indeed give “the border” an ever-shifting meaning.

Today, in most of the world, a national state border is a mix of regimes with variable contents and locations. Different flows—of capital, information, professionals, undocumented workers—each constitute bordering through a particular sequence of interventions, with diverse institutional and geographic locations. The actual geographic border is part of the cross-border flow of goods if they come by ground transport, but not of capital, except if actual cash is being transported. Each border-control intervention can be conceived of as one point in a chain of locations. In the case of traded goods the chain of locations might involve a preborder inspection or certification site. In the case of capital flows the chain will involve banks and stock markets located deep inside national territory and electronic networks that function above the level of national borders. In brief, institutional points of border control intervention can form long chains moving deep inside the country. The geographic borderline is but one point in that chain.

One image we might use to capture this notion of multiple locations is that the sites for the enforcement of border regimes range from banks to bodies. When a bank executes the most elementary money transfer to another country, the bank is one of the sites for border-regime enforcement. A certified good represents a case where the object itself crossing the border is one of the sites for enforcement: the emblematic case is a certified agricultural product. But it also encompasses the case of the tourist carrying a tourist visa and the immigrant carrying the requisite certification. Indeed, in the case of immigration, it is the body of the immigrant herself that is both the carrier of much

CHAPTER 6

Race and the New Southern Migration, 1986 to the Present

Helen B. Marrow¹
Tufts University

INTRODUCTION

The mid-1980s marked a decisive turning point in U.S. immigration history, particularly for two groups: U.S. southerners and Mexican migrants. Before then U.S. southerners were relatively isolated from foreign-born immigrants, who preferred settling in other regions of the country instead. Likewise, before then Mexicans tended to migrate primarily to the U.S. Southwest, where their presence dates back to at least 1848, when various states in this region were still part of Mexico. However, beginning in the 1970s increasing numbers of people began migrating into the U.S. South, attracted by its rapidly developing economy. And beginning in the mid-1980s Mexican migrants began moving away from their traditional states and cities of settlement into other parts of the country, including into the South. These two trends—the changing economy and demography of the U.S. South and the changing demography of Mexican migration—have continued to accelerate and converge into the twenty-first century. Today, Mexicans are the largest and most visible “Hispanic/Latino” and “immigrant” group in a wide array of cities, towns, and rural areas throughout the U.S. South—a region known historically for *not* having large populations of Hispanics/Latinos or foreign-born immigrants and also for creating and policing one of the world’s most stringent racial boundaries between “whites” and “blacks.”

This chapter provides a brief overview of the reasons why Hispanics/Latinos, including Mexican migrants, have settled in the traditional U.S. South over the past few decades, followed by a discussion of the ways in which their growing presence intersects with and challenges southern understandings of race, race relations, and discrimination. I begin by focusing on the phenomenal transformation of the southern economy since the mid-twentieth century, a development that has *pulled* Mexicans, alongside

¹ Support for this chapter was provided by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Princeton, N.J.

migrants from many other countries as well as other parts of the United States, into the region. I then detail the ways in which key economic and political developments in Mexico and other parts of the United States have *pushed* Mexican migrants away from their traditional southwestern settlement states into new ones, including in the U.S. South. Finally, I speculate on how Hispanic/Latino newcomers, including Mexican migrants, may ultimately become incorporated into, and potentially transform, the U.S. South's heretofore binary racial hierarchy.

THE U.S. SOUTH IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

For most of U.S. history, the region known as the "South" attracted relatively few foreign-born immigrants compared with the rest of the United States. In every decade from 1850 to 1970 the South was home to a smaller percentage of immigrants than any other region of the country (Bankston 2007), a distinction it strongly maintained even during mass immigration from Europe and Asia at the turn of the twentieth century. For instance, whereas the proportion of the total nonsouthern population that was foreign born in 1860 was 14 percent, the corresponding figure in the South was only 5 percent. In 1910, following mass immigration from Europe and Asia, these figures widened to nearly 15 and 2 percent, respectively (Reimers 2005), and even as late as 1950 only 1.6 percent of the South's population was foreign born, compared with 6.9 percent nationally and 13.4 percent in the immigrant-heavy Northeast (Eckes 2005). The foreign-born presence in the "traditional South,"² defined here as the former eleven confederate states minus Florida and Texas, which have greater experience with "Hispanics/Latinos" (Bankston 2007; Mohl 2002; Saenz 2000), has historically been even lower than that in the total South. In 1910 only 0.3 percent of North Carolina's population was "foreign-born white," and Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina together contained less than 1 percent of the country's total foreign-born population (Schmid 2003). As late as 1950, each of the traditional southern states still exhibited foreign-born percentages of less than 1 percent (Eckes 2005).

These low numbers have led scholars to characterize the traditional South as "relatively untouched" by nineteenth century European and Asian immigration (Schmid 2003), despite the fact that the region's social and cultural isolation is frequently overdramatized and a variety of immigrant groups did settle throughout it (Bailey 2005; Bankston 2007; Berthoff 1951; Greenbaum 1998; Loewen 1988; Quan 1982; Reimers 2005; Weise 2008). Simply put, scholars agree that the historical proportions of immigrants in the South, and particularly in the nine states comprising the traditional South, were small in comparison to those elsewhere in the country. This was primarily because of the South's plantation agricultural economy before World War II (which offered few attractive job opportunities to immigrants, especially in comparison to expanding industrial opportunities in the Northeast); to the South's relatively undeveloped transportation, communication, and education infrastructures before World War II; and to the South's hostile racial and political climate before the Civil Rights Movement (Bankston 2007; Eckes 2005; Reimers 2005). Between 1864 and 1914, as

Berthoff (1951) writes, "immigration hardly affected southern society in any meaningful sense.... Despite exceptions... the practical problem of amalgamating alien cultures weighed lightly on the South" (345).

However, migration into the U.S. South began increasing in the 1970s, and by 1990, the Midwest had moved down to replace the South as the least common region of foreign-born immigrant settlement (Bankston 2007). Several factors lie behind this dramatic demographic shift, including a much improved southern racial and political climate since the Civil Rights Movement. Yet the main factor is the region's phenomenal economic transformation from a predominantly plantation agricultural into a commercial and industrial economy as it has become increasingly globally integrated since World War II (Cobb 1982; Cobb and Stueck 2005; Eckes 2005; Himes 1991; Kasarda, Hughes, and Irwin 1991; Peacock, Watson, and Matthews 2005; Wright 1986). As Eckes (2005) writes, the South of the 1950s was relatively disadvantaged and economically depressed. Its residents' per capita income hovered around 60 percent of the national average, and its economic landscape was rural and agricultural, heavily dependent on commodities (like tobacco, cotton, and peanuts), and lacking in a strong manufacturing base. But during the next half century, the region soared economically. Its residents' per capita income increased to 87 percent of the national average by 2001; it added 81 percent of the nation's growth in manufacturing employment between 1950 and 1975; it accounted for 28 percent of manufacturing value added by 2000; and it created 35 percent of new service jobs between 1992 and 2002 (a period when all regions of the country were diversifying their employment bases as manufacturing declined relative to high- and low-end services). Massive improvements in information and communications infrastructures facilitated the flow of goods and information throughout the South, whereas improvements in transportation (including interstate highways and jet travel), air conditioning, and education facilitated economic development and made life in the region more hospitable. By the turn of the twenty-first century large corporations (especially those in retailing, petroleum, and commercial banking) had increased their presence in the South dramatically, whereas foreign corporations (such as German and Japanese automakers) had established a permanent presence in the U.S. market by making foreign direct investments in a variety of southern manufacturing facilities. By 1998 the South obtained 31.3 percent of the nation's foreign direct investments and was home to 30.5 percent of the employment it generated—approximately equal to the region's current (and growing) share of the national population.

This "dramatic economic metamorphosis," as Kasarda, Hughes, and Irwin (1991, 40) term it, has reversed much of the South's image as an economic and political backwater, catapulting many southern states—especially Texas and Florida, but even other traditional ones, such as North Carolina—up the "economic momentum" index:

[North Carolina's] Gross State Product increased 4.6 times from \$59,750 million in 1980 to \$272,934 million in 2000.... At the same time, educational levels, although still relatively low, rose in the state.... Because of these trends, per capita income reached 90% of the national level in 1996, up from about 80% in 1980. By the end of the 1990s, North Carolina ranked sixth in the nation on an economic momentum index that combines shifts in employment personal income and population with growth above the national average. (Torres, Podke, and Hanke 2006, 45)

2. Thus, my definition of the "traditional South" includes Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

In so doing, it has also produced an important demographic shift—turning the South from a predominantly labor-exporting to a labor-importing region. Although an estimated 10 million southerners left for other regions of the country between 1910 and 1950, between 1970 and 1978 approximately 3.5 million migrants entered the region instead (Eckes 2005), and in-migration trends continued through the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.

Despite all of the recent media attention given to Hispanic/Latino and foreign-born immigrant population growth in the region, most migrants to the South are actually whites and blacks from other parts of the United States. For example, between 1990 and 2000 the total population of six traditional southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee) grew by 5.2 million people, including 2.3 million whites (who accounted for 45 percent of the growth), 1.3 million blacks (26 percent), and 900,000 Hispanics (17 percent; Kochhar, Suro, and Tafoya 2005). In the South as a whole, the African American population increased by 1.7 million people in the 1970s, another 1.9 million in the 1980s, and still another 3.6 million in the 1990s (Frey 2001). Such high growth rates distinguish southern states from traditional nonsouthern Hispanic settlement states such as California, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois, where white populations declined and black populations grew more slowly over the 1990s (Kochhar, Suro, and Tafoya 2005). Many white and black internal migrants are taking up employment in high-end service and professional jobs in expanding metropolitan centers such as Atlanta, Charlotte, and Raleigh–Durham, attracted by the improved economies, low-density residential lifestyles, and warm climates of these southern “New Sunbelt” cities (Frey 2001). And many of the African Americans among them are “returning home” from earlier ventures that either they or their ancestors made north, now that the South offers an improved economic and less hostile political and racial climate than it used to (Eckes 2005; Frey 2001, 2004; Stack 1996).

But indeed, the South’s economic transformation has also attracted substantial numbers of nonwhite/nonblack migrants, including native-born Hispanic and Asian American internal migrants from other parts of the United States as well as foreign-born immigrants, who come predominantly from Mexico although they hail from a wide variety of countries (Ansley and Shefner 2009; Capps et al. 2007; Smith and Furuseth 2006; Greenbaum 1998; Kasarda and Johnson 2006; Kochhar, Suro, and Tafoya 2005; Lippard and Gallagher 2011; Mohl 2002; Odem and Lacy 2009; Schmid 2003; B. E. Smith 2003; Saenz et al. 2003; Vásquez, Seales, and Marquardt 2008). Many Hispanic migrants,³ primarily those who are foreign born, work in rural southern agriculture, which has shifted toward a predominantly foreign-born labor force since the 1980s (Barcus 2006; Dale, Andreatta, and Freeman 2001; Emery, Ginger, and

Chamberlain 2006; Gozdziak and Bump 2004; Griffith 1993, 2006; Griffith et al. 1995; McDaniel and Casanova 2003; Smith-Nonini 2005, 2009; Studstill and Neito-Studstill 2001; Torres, Popke, and Hapke 2006; Torres et al. 2003). Others are employed in urban and rural southern manufacturing and textiles sectors, which have undergone dramatic economic restructuring and downsizing in recent years (Ergstrom 2001; Donato, Bankston, and Robinson 2001; Donato, Stainback, and Bankston 2005; Fernández-León and Zúñiga 2000; Willis 2005) or work in rural southern food processing plants, where the demand for low-skilled labor has increased dramatically since the 1970s, as food processing companies have decentralized and deskilled production into rural areas of the South and Midwest that have lower wage rates and unionization levels, in response to greater international competition and declining profit margins (Cravey 1997; Donato et al. 2008; Dunn, Aragónés, and Shivers 2005; Fink 2003; Gozdziak and Bump 2004; Griffith 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Guthey 2001; Hirschman and Massey 2008; Kandel and Parrado 2004; Parrado and Kandel 2008; Schoenholtz 2005; Striffler 2005, 2009; Suesse 2009; Stull and Broadway 2004). In urban areas, Hispanic migrants are employed in construction and various high- and low-end services sectors, including landscaping, tourism, restaurants, and janitorial services, all of which have been expanding to meet the needs of the region’s economic and demographic boom (Bailey 2005; Bump 2005; Smith and Furuseth 2006; Johnson-Webb 2003; Odem 2008; Parrado and Kandel 2008; Rich and Miranda 2005; Smith, Mendoza, and Cisel 2005; Winders 2008). Although Hispanics’ rates of professional/managerial and self-employment in the South are relatively smaller in comparison, they are growing. For example, Hispanics’ self-employment rate rose 425 percent in North Carolina between 1995 and 2005, primarily in professional and business services and construction (Kasarda and Johnson 2006).

Overall, the three dominant patterns of Hispanic settlement and occupational concentration, according to Barbara Ellen Smith (2003), illustrate the strong pull of the massive economic restructuring and development processes that have transformed the South into “the nation’s most racially integrated and economically dynamic region” (Cobb and Stueck 2005, xi) since World War II. The first is agricultural employment in nonmetro areas of the South witnessing low Hispanic population growth. The second is employment in labor-intensive industries (such as furniture and poultry processing) in predominantly white, nonmetro areas of the upper South witnessing high Hispanic population growth. And the third is employment in a combination of industries (including construction, services, and manufacturing) in mixed-economy, metro areas of the South witnessing high Hispanic population growth. The economic pull of these various employment sectors is largely responsible for the emergence of both southern Hispanic “hypergrowth” metropolitan areas (Fischer and Tienda 2006; Suro and Singer 2002) and nonmetropolitan ones (Kandel and Cromartie 2004). To fulfill an expanding demand for labor, many urban and rural southern employers have recruited Hispanic migrants from other parts of the country and from abroad, both directly (often utilizing formalized government contracting programs) and indirectly (often shifting toward a reliance on Hispanic migrants’ own social networks: Cravey 1997; Fink 2003; Griffith 1993, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Griffith et al. 1995; Johnson-Webb 2003; Parrado and Kandel 2008; Smith-Nonini 2005, 2009; Stull and Broadway 2004; Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005).

3. Although I recognize that the term Hispanic is controversial, especially in other parts of the United States, I employ it in this chapter for two reasons. First, it provides a convenient way to refer to both foreign- and U.S.-born individuals who fit the U.S. Census’ official definition of Hispanics/Latinos, thereby maintaining relative consistency with the dominant understanding of who this racialized ethnic category includes at the turn of the twenty-first century, as defined by major U.S. public institutions. Second, and more importantly, it reflects how the terms Hispanic and Latino were used on the ground in the rural South during the time of my field research in 2003–2004—largely interchangeably and referring to both foreign- and U.S.-born individuals—while maintaining consistency by using only one term as much as possible.

Nevertheless, other political and economic *push* factors are also at play behind the rising presence of Hispanics, especially Mexican migrants, in the traditional South.

MEXICAN MIGRATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

For most of the twentieth century, foreign-born Mexican immigration to the United States has been highly concentrated, primarily in the five "Mexican gateway states" of Arizona, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas. Between 1910 and 1960, for example, roughly 85 percent of all Mexican immigrants migrated to Texas, California, and Arizona, whereas only 11 percent migrated to other states (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005). During the "bracero era of migration" (1942–1964), Mexican immigration increasingly shifted away from Texas and toward California, a trend that continued into the "undocumented era of migration" (1964–1985), when California consolidated its position as the premier destination for Mexican immigrants, capturing a full 53 percent of foreign-born Mexican immigrants in 1970 and an even higher 57 percent in 1980. Mexican immigrant concentration in California peaked at 58 percent in 1990, whereas its counterpart in Texas bottomed out at 22 percent, completing the shift from Texas to California; meanwhile, Mexican immigration into the other forty-five "nongateway" states fell from 11.2 percent in 1910 to 8.5 percent in 1980 (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005).

Yet in 1986, the United States passed a crucial piece of legislation that fundamentally altered the geography of Mexican migration: the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The IRCA involved a tripartite strategy with the goal of eliminating illegal immigration: first, two legalization programs, one for long-term undocumented immigrants and another for temporary Seasonal Agricultural Workers (SAWs); second, a new system of employer sanctions that prohibited the hiring of illegal immigrants; and third, stepped-up enforcement activity at the U.S.–Mexico border. As a result of IRCA's legalization programs, approximately 2.3 million Mexican immigrants (and another approximately 700,000 non-Mexican immigrants) gained legal status between 1987 and 1990. Approximately 55 percent of them lived in California, with approximately 40 percent in the southern portion of the state alone (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).

Such a massive legalization not only saturated local labor markets in southern California but also gave these newly legalized Mexican immigrants the political freedom to move elsewhere in search of better job opportunities. Meanwhile, the new system of employer sanctions encouraged employers to shift to labor subcontracting in the form of avoiding stiff penalties for hiring undocumented immigrants directly, and the hopes of avoiding stiff penalties for hiring intermediary subcontractors were passed down to workers in the form of lower wages. Finally, the downward pressure on wages caused by IRCA's legalization and employer sanctions strategies occurred against a backdrop of deteriorating economic conditions and growing anti-immigrant sentiment in California during the early 1990s. As the state entered a severe economic recession resulting from cutbacks in the defense industry, unemployment rose, wages stagnated, and public sentiment began to turn against immigrants. In 1994, California voters passed Proposition

187, which sought to bar undocumented immigrants from receiving publicly provided health, education, and welfare services. Although it was declared unconstitutional by the California courts three years later, Proposition 187 sent a strong symbolic message to Mexican immigrants that they were no longer welcome there (Massey and Capoferro 2008; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).

Thus, as Durand, Massey and Capoferro (2005) write, the early 1990s witnessed "an unusual coincidence of conditions in California: an IRCA-induced restructuring of immigrant employment toward subcontracting, declining net wages for immigrants, a severe recession and high unemployment, growing native hostility, and greater wage competition triggered by a flood of newly legalized immigrants entering local labor markets" (12). The expansion of freedom and mobility among newly legalized Mexican immigrants (who were also now eligible to sponsor family members of their own for legal immigration) took place within a larger context of increasing regional economic integration among the United States, Canada, and Mexico following passage of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986 and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and alongside a deepening economic crisis in Mexico following a huge peso devaluation in December 1994 (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Like other profound economic dislocations associated with the process of economic development in Latin America, which have uprooted various segments of the lower and middle classes and given them greater incentives to migrate northward in search of better wages and socioeconomic stability, the economic crisis in Mexico generated new needs for capital, credit, and security among lower- and middle-class Mexicans in both traditional and new sending states of Mexico, encouraging additional migration northward (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005). Together, these political and economic *push* factors not only encouraged Mexican immigrants already in California in the late 1980s and early 1990s to migrate elsewhere in the country for better job opportunities, but also encouraged new and aspiring Mexican immigrants to avoid California entirely.

Adding fuel to the fire, in the mid-1990s new and aspiring *undocumented* Mexican immigrants were further channeled away from California by the selective militarization of the U.S.–Mexico border, particularly in the forms of Operation Blockade, launched in El Paso, Texas, in September 1993 and Operation Gatekeeper, launched in San Diego, California, in October 1994. These border control efforts were intended to stop the flow of illegal Mexican immigration into the United States at its two most popular points of entry through a strategy called "prevention by deterrence." Yet they had the unanticipated effects of shifting illegal Mexican immigration through new, less densely populated entry points (like the deserts of Arizona and the wilder parts of the lower Río Grande Valley in Texas) and later into new final destination states. They also had the unanticipated effects of transforming a once temporary and circular illegal Mexican migration stream into a more permanently settled one because border militarization raised the costs not only of crossing the border into the United States, but also of crossing back out again and thus having to contemplate a difficult repeat entry (Cornelius and Lewis 2007; Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005; Massey and Capoferro 2008; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).

The end result of these *push* factors, combined with the *pull* factors of increased job growth and labor demand in many southern, midwestern, and mountain nongateway

states, was a massive redistribution of Mexican migrants away from traditional border crossing points as well as their five traditional gateway settlement states. This pattern emerges most visibly in U.S. Census data after 1990. Between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of foreign-born Mexican immigrants located in California dropped 10 percentage points, from 58 to 48 percent and continued to decline to an all-time low of 19 percent in Texas. In contrast, the share going to the forty-five nongateway states more than doubled, reaching the highest percentage in the history of U.S.-Mexico migration (21 percent) in 2000 (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005). Geographic dispersion is even more visible among *recently arrived* Mexican immigrants. Whereas 63 percent of Mexican immigrants who arrived between 1985 and 1990 went to California, only 35 percent of those who arrived between 1995 and 2000 did. In contrast, whereas only 13 percent of Mexican immigrants who arrived between 1995 and 2000 did. Therefore, after three decades of declining diversity in Mexican immigrants' destinations between 1960 and 1990, their variety increased dramatically in the 1990s. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, by 2000 new centers of reception had emerged in Florida, Idaho, Nevada, New York/New Jersey, and North Carolina, and others were emerging in Georgia, Iowa, Oregon, and Minnesota (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005).

Massey and Capoferro (2008) show that geographic dispersion is evident among foreign-born immigrant groups other than Mexicans, but not in as concentrated a fashion. The geographic settlement patterns of other Latin American immigrant groups were much more diverse in 1990 to begin with and did not change radically by 2000. Similarly, those of Asian immigrant groups were even more diverse than those of other Latin American immigrants in 1990 and exhibited little change by 2000, whereas those of non-Asian/non-Latino immigrants also exhibited relatively high diversity by 1980 and increased slightly by 2000 before stabilizing thereafter. The geographic settlement patterns of Mexican immigrants, by contrast, had transformed radically from a homogeneous baseline in 1990, when approximately two thirds of recently arrived Mexican immigrants went to California alone. Massey and Capoferro (2008) argue that although these differential patterns of dispersion provide some positive support for the roles of IRCA, Proposition 187 in California, and surging labor demand in nongateway states in shifting all immigrant groups' settlement patterns from gateway to nongateway states, they also signal the crucial role of U.S. border enforcement policies in shifting those of Mexican immigrants most markedly.

AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW OF HISPANIC AND IMMIGRANT PRESENCE IN THE TRADITIONAL SOUTH

These two trends—the changing economy and demography of the U.S. South and the changing demography of Mexican migration—accelerated and converged into the twenty-first century. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 document the increasing numbers of people of “Hispanic/Latino origin ethnicity” living in traditional southern states from 1980 to 2007, comparing them with figures at the national level and in both “traditional immigrant” and “traditional Mexican immigrant” gateway states. Data come from 5 percent Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples of the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Censuses and




Figure 6.1 Percentage of Population, Foreign-born from Mexico, 2000 U.S. Census.

Source: Originally published on the Migration Policy Institute Data Hub (<http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub>), a project of the Washington, D.C.-based Migration Policy Institute, an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank dedicated to the study of movement of people worldwide. Reprinted with permission.

Table 6.1. Hispanic Origin Ethnicity Population by U.S. State of Residence, 1980–2007^a, Traditional Immigrant and Mexican Immigrant Gateway States^b

	1980	1990 ^c	2000	2007	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1990–2000	CHANGE 2000–2007
ARIZONA	448,660	686,742	1,293,036	1,739,157	53%	88%	35%
% Hispanic of state's population	(16.5)	(18.8)	(25.2)	(29.7)			
<i>Native born Hispanic origin population</i>	364,360	502,354	819,575	1,094,039			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(81.2)	(73.2)	(63.4)	(48.8)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	403,600	625,885	1,080,251	108,376			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(90.0)	(91.1)	(83.5)	(88.5)			
NEW MEXICO	480,980	572,655	761,252	832,817	19%	33%	9%
% Hispanic of state's population	(36.7)	(38.0)	(44.7)	(44.9)			
<i>Native born Hispanic origin population</i>	451,000	512,955	643,387	691,900			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(93.8)	(89.6)	(84.5)	(83.1)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	231,480	330,612	340,258	431,084			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(48.1)	(57.7)	(41.8)	(51.8)			
CALIFORNIA	4,575,860	7,563,270	10,904,256	12,383,283	65%	44%	14%
% Hispanic of state's population	(19.3)	(25.5)	(32.3)	(35.9)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	2,871,300	4,095,784	6,075,101	7,258,340			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(62.7)	(54.2)	(55.7)	(58.6)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	3,633,000	6,074,368	8,541,966	10,293,693			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(79.4)	(80.3)	(78.3)	(83.1)			
ILLINOIS	648,440	882,240	1,518,401	1,870,074	36%	72%	23%
% Hispanic of state's population	(5.7)	(7.7)	(12.2)	(14.9)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	404,480	511,374	810,535	1,083,128			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(62.4)	(58.0)	(53.4)	(57.9)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	413,900	616,995	1,144,681	1,464,711			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(63.8)	(69.9)	(75.4)	(78.3)			
TEXAS	3,015,100	4,304,325	6,637,415	8,223,008	43%	54%	24%
% Hispanic of state's population	(21.1)	(25.4)	(31.9)	(36.3)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	2,419,060	3,159,077	4,479,755	5,506,326			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(80.2)	(73.4)	(67.5)	(67.0)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	2,777,680	3,912,159	5,148,230	6,993,057			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(92.1)	(90.9)	(77.6)	(85.0)			
FLORIDA	871,640	1,557,635	2,658,878	3,630,578	79%	71%	37%
% Hispanic of state's population	(8.9)	(12.1)	(16.7)	(20.9)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	341,680	618,401	1,169,727	1,730,796			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(39.2)	(39.7)	(44.0)	(47.7)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	77,140	157,484	362,099	576,880			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(8.8)	(10.1)	(13.6)	(15.9)			

(Continued)

Table 6.1. Hispanic Origin Ethnicity Population by U.S. State of Residence, 1980–2007^a, Traditional Immigrant and Mexican Immigrant Gateway States^b (Continued)

	1980	1990 ^c	2000	2007	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1990–2000	CHANGE 2000–2007
NEW YORK	1,688,180	2,155,499	2,835,875	2,956,552	28%	32%	4%
% Hispanic of state's population	(9.6)	(12.0)	(15.0)	(16.0)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	1,218,240	1,380,027	1,685,544	1,760,263			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(72.2)	(64.0)	(59.4)	(59.5)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	40,820	89,291	257,301	369,339			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(2.4)	(4.1)	(9.1)	(12.5)			
UNITED STATES	14,775,080	21,938,225	35,084,271	43,355,316	48%	60%	24%
% Hispanic of country's population	(6.5)	(8.8)	(12.5)	(14.9)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	10,483,980	13,809,367	20,802,366	26,089,346			
<i>% Native born of country's Hispanics</i>	(71.0)	(62.9)	(59.3)	(60.2)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	8,771,800	13,440,061	20,829,881	27,856,034			
<i>% Mexican origin of country's Hispanics</i>	(59.4)	(61.3)	(59.4)	(64.3)			

SOURCES: Five percent Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) of the 1980–2000 U.S. Decennial Censuses and 2007 American Community Survey (Ruggles et al. 2004), author's analyses, household weighted data.

^aHispanic origin is defined as anyone declaring some Hispanic-origin ethnicity as defined by the U.S. Census, regardless of place of birth (i.e., Hispanic, Latino, Spanish, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central American, South American, etc.). Mexican origin is defined as anyone declaring some Mexican-origin ethnicity, regardless of place of birth (i.e., Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, etc.). Native-born is defined as anyone born inside U.S. territory or U.S. possessions or abroad or at sea with U.S. citizenship.

^bThe "big five" traditional total immigrant gateway states are California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois (Massey and Capoferro 2008). The "big five" traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states are Arizona, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005).

^cPercentages of Mexicans among total foreign-born populations in 1990 may appear small because of large numbers of foreign-born respondents recorded as being "Abroad, not specified" in that year (compared with in 2000–2007 data).

Table 6.2. Hispanic Origin Ethnicity Population by U.S. State of Residence, 1980–2007^a, Traditional Southern States^b

	1980	1990 ^c	2000	2007	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1990–2000	CHANGE 2000–2007
ALABAMA	34,940	22,336	71,340	121,538	-36%	219%	70%
% Hispanic of state's population	(0.9)	(0.6)	(1.6)	(2.7)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	31,360	17,603	39,164	58,831			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(89.8)	(78.8)	(59.4)	(48.4)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	20,100	8,534	40,926	84,459			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(57.5)	(38.2)	(57.4)	(69.5)			
ARKANSAS	17,120	20,885	84,081	143,652	22%	303%	71%
% Hispanic of state's population	(0.7)	(0.9)	(3.2)	(5.2)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	15,180	15,206	44,363	68,886			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(88.7)	(72.8)	(52.8)	(48.0)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	10,620	13,119	58,838	108,376			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(62.0)	(62.8)	(70.0)	(75.4)			
GEORGIA	62,860	99,059	431,008	665,891	58%	335%	54%
% Hispanic of state's population	(1.2)	(1.5)	(5.3)	(7.4)			
<i>Native-born Hispanic origin population</i>	50,020	56,050	166,185	295,950			
<i>% Native born of state's Hispanics</i>	(79.6)	(56.6)	(38.6)	(44.4)			
<i>Mexican origin population</i>	27,620	45,477	274,472	414,327			
<i>% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics</i>	(43.9)	(45.9)	(63.7)	(62.2)			

(Continued)

Table 6.2. Hispanic Origin Ethnicity Population by U.S. State of Residence, 1980–2007^a, Traditional Southern States^b (Continued)

	1980	1990 ^c	2000	2007	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1990–2000	CHANGE 2000–2007
LOUISIANA	102,020	90,303	111,488	129,005	-11%	23%	16%
% Hispanic of state's population	(2.4)	(2.2)	(2.5)	(3.1)			
Native-born Hispanic origin population	78,080	57,204	68,679	67,271			
% Native born of state's Hispanics	(76.5)	(63.3)	(61.6)	(52.1)			
Mexican origin population	26,500	22,920	34,586	43,155			
% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics	(25.4)	(25.4)	(31.0)	(35.3)			
MISSISSIPPI	23,500	15,801	36,718	50,141	-33%	132%	37%
% Hispanic of state's population	(0.9)	(0.6)	(1.3)	(1.8)			
Native-born Hispanic origin population	21,060	12,684	23,504	24,814			
% Native born of state's Hispanics	(89.6)	(80.3)	(64.0)	(49.5)			
Mexican origin population	13,860	7,455	20,108	35,016			
% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics	(59.0)	(47.2)	(54.8)	(69.8)			
NORTH CAROLINA	58,220	67,128	374,316	648,245	15%	458%	73%
% Hispanic of state's population	(1.0)	(1.0)	(4.7)	(7.3)			
Native-born Hispanic origin population	49,160	45,435	145,441	285,453			
% Native born of state's Hispanics	(84.4)	(67.7)	(38.9)	(44.4)			
Mexican origin population	28,320	29,016	239,222	425,334			
% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics	(48.6)	(43.2)	(63.9)	(65.6)			
SOUTH CAROLINA	33,960	27,114	91,210	172,910	-20%	236%	90%
% Hispanic of state's population	(1.1)	(0.8)	(2.3)	(4.1)			
Native-born Hispanic origin population	4,000	19,761	45,207	79,005			
% Native born of state's Hispanics	(86.2)	(72.9)	(49.6)	(45.7)			
Mexican origin population	2,680	8,895	50,697	108,201			
% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics	(56.0)	(32.8)	(55.6)	(62.6)			
TENNESSEE	34,980	31,275	115,577	189,583	-11%	270%	64%
% Hispanic of state's population	(0.8)	(0.6)	(2.0)	(3.2)			
Native-born Hispanic origin population	30,940	24,441	57,352	85,499			
% Native born of state's Hispanics	(88.5)	(78.1)	(49.6)	(45.1)			
Mexican origin population	19,760	13,860	73,532	124,125			
% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics	(56.5)	(44.3)	(63.6)	(65.5)			
VIRGINIA	82,280	154,401	332,772	466,295	88%	116%	40%
% Hispanic of state's population	(1.5)	(2.5)	(4.7)	(6.2)			
Native-born Hispanic origin population	54,620	75,738	155,212	226,075			
% Native born of state's Hispanics	(66.4)	(49.1)	(46.6)	(48.5)			
Mexican origin population	23,900	32,589	77,766	121,122			
% Mexican origin of state's Hispanics	(29.0)	(21.1)	(23.4)	(26.0)			
UNITED STATES	14,775,080	21,938,225	35,084,271	43,355,316	48%	60%	24%
% Hispanic of country's population	(6.5)	(8.8)	(12.5)	(14.9)			
Native-born Hispanic origin population	10,483,980	13,809,367	20,802,366	26,089,346			
% Native born of country's Hispanics	(71.0)	(62.9)	(59.3)	(60.2)			
Mexican origin population	8,771,800	13,440,061	20,829,881	27,856,034			
% Mexican origin of country's Hispanics	(59.4)	(61.3)	(59.4)	(64.3)			

SOURCE: Five percent Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) of the 1980–2000 U.S. Decennial Censuses and 2007 American Community Survey (Ruggles et al. 2004), author's analyses, household weighted data.

^aHispanic origin is defined as anyone declaring some Hispanic-origin ethnicity as defined by the U.S. Census, regardless of place of birth (i.e., Hispanic, Latino, Spanish, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central American, South American, etc.). Mexican origin is defined as anyone declaring some Mexican-origin ethnicity, regardless of place of birth (i.e., Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, etc.). Native-born is defined as anyone born inside U.S. territory or U.S. possessions or abroad or at sea with U.S. citizenship.

^bTraditional southern states are defined as the eleven former confederate states minus Florida and Texas.

^cPercentages of Mexicans among total foreign-born populations in 1990 may appear small because of large numbers of foreign-born respondents recorded as being "Abroad, not specified" in that year (compared with 2000–2007 data).

the 2007 American Community Survey and capture representative population trends within a 5 percent margin of error (Ruggles et al. 2004). Hispanics/Latinos include all persons declaring some Hispanic origin ethnicity as defined by the U.S. Census (i.e., Hispanic, Latino, Spanish, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central American, South American, etc.), regardless of whether they are native born or foreign born.

Table 6.1 shows that Texas and Florida—the South's two contemporary immigrant "access" states (Bankston 2007)—have long had a much larger population of Hispanics/Latinos than any of the nine traditional southern states. Texas' Hispanic population increased from 3,015,100 in 1980 to 8,223,008 in 2007, whereas Florida's increased from 871,640 in 1980 to 3,630,578 in 2007. In contrast, Table 6.2 shows that the nine traditional southern states started out with much smaller Hispanic populations in 1980, ranging from just 17,120 in Arkansas and 23,500 in Mississippi to 82,280 in Virginia and a peak of 102,020 in Louisiana. Despite these lower absolute numbers of Hispanics/Latinos, their relative proportions began to grow slowly in selected traditional southern states during the 1980s, surged during the 1990s, and then continued growing at above-average rates into the mid-2000s.

For instance, the Hispanic populations of Virginia, Georgia, Arkansas, and North Carolina—which Bankston (2007) refers to as new southern economic "opportunity" states—posted positive Hispanic growth rates as early as the 1980s (at 88, 58, 22, and 15 percent, respectively). In some cases these growth rates even rivaled those in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states during the 1980s. By contrast, the Hispanic populations of Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Tennessee—which Bankston (2007) refers to as southern "limited migration" states—declined during the 1980s (by 36, 33, 20, 11, and 11 percent, respectively). These declining rates reflect the relative lack of economic industrialization and globalization in the lower South compared with the upper South during this decade, particularly in the three "Deep South Triad" states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, which constitute one of the nation's oldest peripheral regions, with stagnant economies and slow-growing metropolitan areas (Elliott and Ionescu 2003). In 1980, the large majority of Hispanics in all of these traditional southern states were native born, ranging from a low of 66.4 percent in Virginia to a high of 89.8 percent in Alabama. Roughly half also reported some kind of Mexican-origin ethnicity (such as Mexican, Mexican American, or Chicano), with notable exceptions in Louisiana and Virginia, where Hispanics were more likely to report Central or South American origin ethnicities instead.

Over the 1990s, however, Hispanic population growth rates in the traditional southern states surged. They surpassed the national average rate of 60 percent, as well as rates in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states (which ranged from a low of 32 percent in New York to a high of 88 percent in Arizona) by very large margins. The upper South opportunity states continued to lead the way. During the 1990s, North Carolina's Hispanic population grew by 458 percent, Georgia's by 335 percent, and Arkansas' by 303 percent (Virginia's slowed down in relative comparison, to 116 percent). But in this decade, compared with the 1980s, southern opportunity states were also joined by another upper South state (Tennessee) and several lower South previously "limited migration" states (South Carolina, Alabama,

and Mississippi) that were beginning to undergo more rapid economic development. The three Deep South Triad states continued to post the lowest absolute numbers of Hispanics in 2000, as well as the lowest relative Hispanic growth rates over the 1990s. Nonetheless, in this decade only Louisiana posted a Hispanic growth rate (23 percent) below the national average or below that in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states.

Thus, the 1990s were truly remarkable in the U.S. South. The proportions of Hispanics among southern states' total populations rose notably in the course of these ten years, for example, from 1.2 to 5.3 percent in Georgia, 1.0 to 4.7 percent in North Carolina, and 0.9 to 3.2 percent in Arkansas. *Native-born* Hispanics contributed significantly to these rising numbers, signaling that population growth in the 1990s was spurred in part by the internal migration of Hispanics born in other U.S. states, as well as by some "natural increase" of Hispanics born in these southern states themselves. For example, Alabama's native-born Hispanic population rose from 17,603 in 1990 to 39,164 in 2000; likewise, Georgia's rose from 56,050 to 166,185, Louisiana's from 57,204 to 68,679, North Carolina's from 45,435 to 145,441, Tennessee's from 24,441 to 57,352, and Virginia's from 75,738 to 155,212.

Nonetheless, the proportions of native-born to foreign-born Hispanics in traditional southern states actually *decreased* during the 1990s, signaling that a significant proportion of Hispanic population growth during this decade was fueled by *foreign-born Hispanic immigrants* (Saenz et al. 2003; Vásquez, Seales, and Marquardt 2008). To illustrate, whereas Georgia's native-born Hispanic population rose from 56,050 in 1990 to 166,185 in 2000 (for a total addition of 110,135 native-born Hispanics), its foreign-born Hispanic population rose from 43,009 in 1990 to 264,823 in 2000 (for a total addition of 221,814 foreign-born Hispanics), reducing the percentage of native-born Hispanics among Georgia's total Hispanic population from 56.6 percent in 1990 to 38.6 percent in 2000. Across the traditional southern states, a similar trend emerged in the 1990s: the number of native-born and foreign-born Hispanics grew rapidly, although the number of foreign-born Hispanics grew most rapidly. By 2000, the Hispanic populations of traditional southern states, although still smaller in absolute numbers than those in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states (see Table 6.1), had grown extremely rapidly, had become more heavily populated by foreign-born Hispanic immigrants as opposed to native-born Hispanics, and had become more heavily Mexican in ethnic origin (see Table 6.2).

Between 2000 and 2007, the Hispanic populations of traditional southern states continued to increase, although their growth rates tapered in comparison to the high levels posted during the 1990s. During the first seven years of this decade, most traditional southern states registered Hispanic growth rates between 50 and 90 percent, although Virginia's grew only by 40 percent and Mississippi's by only 37 percent. Only Louisiana posted a Hispanic growth rate (16 percent) below the national average rate of 24 percent or below rates in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states (which ranged from a low of 4 percent in New York to a high of 37 percent in Florida). Also, the declines in the proportions of native-born to foreign-born Hispanics witnessed in traditional southern states between 1980 and 2000 began to stabilize and in some cases even reverse between 2000 and 2007 (with the exceptions of Mississippi and Louisiana). This signals that the Hispanic populations in many of these

states had begun to mature by the mid-2000s, likely through some relative decrease in foreign-born immigration as well as through the additional natural increase of Hispanics born in these states themselves. By 2007, most traditional southern states' Hispanic populations had also become more heavily Mexican in ethnic origin as well, continuing a trend in effect since 1980, which is also evident in data on the foreign-born immigrant population, to which I now turn.

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 document the increasing numbers of foreign-born immigrants living in traditional southern states from 1980 to 2007, comparing them with figures at the national level and in both traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states. Foreign-born immigrants include all persons born outside U.S. territory or U.S. possessions or abroad or at sea without U.S. citizenship. Table 6.3 shows that, again, Texas and Florida, the South's two contemporary immigrant "access" states, have long had much larger population of foreign-born immigrants than any of the nine traditional southern states. Texas' foreign-born population increased from 956,660 in 1980 to 3,819,090 in 2007, whereas Florida's increased from 1,117,980 in 1980 to 3,436,074 in 2007. In contrast, Table 6.4 shows that the nine traditional southern states started out with much smaller foreign-born populations in 1980, ranging from just 29,080 in Arkansas and 30,520 in Mississippi to 118,280 in Georgia and a peak of 222,700 in Virginia. Despite these lower absolute numbers of foreign-born immigrants, their relative proportions began to grow in most of the traditional southern states during the 1980s, increased even faster during the 1990s, and then continued to grow at above-average rates into the mid-2000s. In each of these decades, the growth of Mexican immigrants outpaced that of other non-Mexican immigrants, often by large margins.

For instance, all of the traditional southern states witnessed some foreign-born population growth during the 1980s. As we saw in data on the Hispanic/Latino population, the new southern economic "opportunity" states of Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina led the way in foreign-born population growth, although here they were joined by Louisiana (whose foreign-born population expanded by 94 percent) instead of Arkansas, and the southern "limited migration" states of Alabama, South Carolina, and Tennessee followed suit with slower foreign-born growth rates (Mississippi registered zero foreign-born growth during the 1980s). In most states the foreign-born Mexican population rose much faster than the total foreign-born population, surpassing the national average foreign-born growth rate of 43 percent as well as foreign-born rates in traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states (which ranged from 18 percent in Illinois to 80 percent in California). For example, the Mexican foreign-born population grew by an astounding 1,130 percent in Georgia, 926 percent in North Carolina, and 410 percent in Virginia, 300 percent in Arkansas, 298 percent in South Carolina, and 227 percent in Alabama. Nonetheless, in 1990 Mexicans still comprised relatively small proportions of traditional southern states' total foreign-born populations; whereas Mexicans constituted 20.6 percent of all immigrants in the United States in 1990 and upward of 28 percent of those in traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states, they constituted just 1.8 to 9.4 percent of immigrants in the traditional South.

Over the 1990s, similar to what we saw in data on the Hispanic/Latino population, foreign-born population growth rates in traditional southern states increased notably. They surpassed the national average foreign-born growth rate of 52 percent and often also rates in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway

Table 6.3. Foreign-born Population by U.S. State of Residence, 1980–2007^a, Traditional Immigrant and Mexican Immigrant Gateway States^b

	1980	1990 ^c	2000	2007	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1990–2000
ARIZONA	186,940	320,259	705,419	950,365	71%	120%	35%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(6.9)	(8.8)	(13.8)	(16.2)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	74,420	163,271	444,369	597,390.00	119%	172%	34%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(39.8)	(51.0)	(63.0)	(62.9)			
NEW MEXICO	60,380	95,838	166,203	192,771	59%	73%	16%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(4.6)	(6.4)	(9.1)	(10.4)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	23,800	52,452	108,791	132,357	120%	107%	22%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(39.4)	(54.7)	(65.5)	(68.7)			
CALIFORNIA	3,746,880	6,752,123	9,100,384	9,579,063	80%	35%	5%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(15.8)	(22.8)	(26.9)	(27.8)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	1,283,900	2,514,639	3,926,474	4,157,559	96%	56%	6%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(34.3)	(37.2)	(43.1)	(43.4)			
ILLINOIS	857,440	1,008,957	1,582,803	1,746,947	18%	57%	10%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(7.5)	(8.9)	(12.8)	(14.0)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	174,180	288,507	616,455	675,298	66%	114%	10%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(20.3)	(28.6)	(38.9)	(38.7)			
TEXAS	956,660	1,703,381	3,059,835	3,819,090	78%	80%	25%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(6.7)	(10.1)	(14.7)	(16.9)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	516,260	961,727	1,900,132	2,343,626	86%	98%	23%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(54.0)	(56.5)	(62.1)	(61.4)			

(Continued)

Table 6.3. Foreign-born Population by U.S. State of Residence, 1980–2007^a, Traditional Immigrant and Mexican Immigrant Gateway States^b (Continued)

	1980	1990 ^c	2000	2007	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1990–2000
FLORIDA	1,117,980	1,776,468	2,785,053	3,436,074	59%	57%	23%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(11.4)	(13.8)	(17.5)	(19.8)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	14,220	58,406	192,935	312,460	311%	230%	62%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(1.3)	(3.3)	(6.9)	(9.1)			
NEW YORK	2,457,440	2,993,123	3,957,066	4,037,575	22%	32%	2%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(14.0)	(16.7)	(20.9)	(21.8)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	11,060	48,711	165,089	211,392	340%	239%	28%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(0.5)	(1.6)	(4.2)	(5.2)			
UNITED STATES	15,142,700	21,586,277	32,866,997	38,044,370	43%	52%	16%
% Foreign-born of country's Population	(6.7)	(8.7)	(11.7)	(13.1)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	2,242,100	4,447,867	9,247,556	11,200,178	98%	108%	21%
% Mexican of country's foreign-born population	(14.8)	(20.6)	(28.1)	(29.4)			

SOURCES: Five percent Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) of the 1980–2000 U.S. Decennial Censuses and 2007 American Community Survey (Ruggles et al. 2004), author's analyses, household weighted data.

^aForeign-born is defined as anyone born outside U.S. territory or U.S. possessions or abroad or at sea without U.S. citizenship. Mexican-born is defined as anyone declaring place of birth in Mexico.

^bThe "big five" traditional total immigrant gateway states are California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois (Massey and Capoferro 2008). The "big five" traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states are Arizona, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and Texas (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005).

^cPercentages of Mexicans among total foreign-born populations in 1990 may appear small because of large numbers of foreign-born respondents recorded as being "Abroad, not specified" in that year (compared with 2000–2007 data).

Table 6.4. Foreign-born Population by U.S. State of Residence, 1980–2007^a, Traditional Southern States^b

	1980	1990 ^c	2000	2007	CHANGE 1980–1990	CHANGE 1990–2000	CHANGE 2000–2007
ALABAMA	53,580	64,101	115,432	161,381	20%	80%	40%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(1.4)	(1.6)	(2.6)	(3.6)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	360	1,176	23,285	48,921	227%	1880%	110%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(0.7)	(1.8)	(20.2)	(30.3)			
ARKANSAS	29,080	35,629	85,250	126,963	23%	139%	49%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(1.3)	(1.5)	(3.2)	(4.6)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	840	3,356	31,918	58,212	300%	851%	82%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(2.9)	(9.4)	(37.4)	(45.8)			
GEORGIA	118,280	223,663	641,761	864,947	89%	187%	35%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(2.2)	(3.5)	(7.9)	(9.7)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	1,640	20,177	194,778	243,971	1130%	865%	25%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(1.4)	(9.0)	(30.4)	(28.2)			
LOUISIANA	54,240	105,228	138,320	154,985	94%	31%	12%
% Foreign-born of state's population	(1.9)	(2.5)	(3.1)	(3.8)			
Foreign-born Mexican population	3,200	3,888	10,577	13,561	22%	172%	28%
% Mexican of state's foreign-born population	(5.9)	(3.7)	(7.6)	(8.7)			

(Continued)

states (which ranged from a low of 32 percent in New York to a high of 120 percent in Arizona). The upper South "opportunity" states continued to lead the way. During the 1990s, North Carolina's foreign-born population grew by 209 percent, Georgia's by 187 percent, and Arkansas' by 139 percent (Virginia's and Louisiana's slowed down in relative comparison, to 69 and 31 percent), and were further joined by several lower South previously "limited migration" states (Tennessee at 137 percent, South Carolina at 100 percent, and Alabama at 80 percent). Again, the three Deep South Triad states continued to post some of the lowest absolute numbers of foreign-born immigrants in 2000, as well as the lowest relative foreign-born growth rates over the 1990s of all southern states, yet their growth rates still exceeded many of those in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states during this decade.

Even more importantly, the *Mexican* foreign-born populations of these traditional southern states jumped dramatically during the 1990s, far surpassing the average Mexican foreign-born national average rate of 108 percent as well as Mexican foreign-born rates in traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states (which ranged from 56 percent in California to 172 percent in Arizona). And not only did Mexican foreign-born growth rates rise in several of the upper South "opportunity" states (to 1,586 percent in North Carolina, 865 percent in Georgia, and 851 percent in Arkansas), they rose even more impressively in many of the lower South previously "limited migration" states (to 1,880 percent in Alabama, 1,727 percent in Tennessee, 1,597 percent in South Carolina, and 951 percent in Mississippi). Even Louisiana, the low-growth outlier among traditional southern states, witnessed a 172 percent increase in its Mexican foreign-born population during the 1990s, equal to the highest rate of increase in a traditional Mexican immigrant gateway state.

Thus, whereas in 2000 the foreign-born populations of traditional southern states remained much smaller in absolute numbers than those in traditional immigrant and traditional Mexican immigrant gateway states (see Table 6.3), they had grown much more rapidly since 1980, and their Mexican foreign-born populations had increased particularly dramatically. Overall, the proportions of foreign-born immigrants among southern states' total populations had risen notably in the course of these ten years, for example, from 6.2 to 9.2 percent in Virginia, 3.5 to 7.9 percent in Georgia, 2.4 to 6.0 percent in North Carolina, 2.1 to 3.6 percent in South Carolina, and 1.6 to 3.3 percent in Tennessee. And whereas Mexicans constituted just 0.7 to 5.9 percent of all foreign-born immigrants in the traditional South in 1980 and only 1.8 to 9.4 percent in 1990, by 2000 they constituted a full one to two fifths of all foreign-born immigrants in many traditional southern states! Consistent with the literature documenting the significant geographic dispersion of immigrants, particularly *Mexican* ones, after IRCA was implemented in 1986 and selective border militarization began in 1993, foreign-born Mexican immigration into the traditional South picked up substantially in the late 1980s and reached full force in the 1990s.

Between 2000 and 2007, the foreign-born populations of traditional southern states continued to increase, although again at tapered rates compared with the high levels posted during the 1990s. During the first seven years of this decade, most traditional southern states registered foreign-born growth rates between 25 and 55 percent and foreign-born Mexican growth rates between 55 and 115 percent (again, only Louisiana posted a foreign-born growth rate below the national average of 16 percent). By 2007,

the percentage of Mexicans among southern states' total foreign-born populations had continued to increase, reaching an impressive one third to one half of all foreign-born immigrants in every state except Virginia and Louisiana.

Various case studies in the traditional South confirm the significance of the 1990s to Hispanic population growth, particularly that driven by foreign-born Mexican immigrants. In Dalton, Georgia, for example, Hernández-León and Zúñiga (2000) find that although some "trailblazing" Mexican pioneer migrants did arrive during the pre-IRCA era, the majority arrived after 1992. Furthermore, although many of these Mexican migrants were "secondary migrants" who had first come from Mexico to a traditional immigrant-receiving state (such as California, Texas, Florida, and Illinois), those who were more recently arrived were also more likely to be direct migrants from Mexico. Hernández-León and Zúñiga (2000) argue that these patterns highlight the importance of IRCA in shifting many Mexican immigrants' settlement preferences away from traditional destination states into new southern ones. Before 1986, Mexican migrants in Dalton, Georgia, had clearly preferred California and Texas as gateway states, whereas increasingly after 1987, Georgia had become the single most important destination for migrants undertaking their initial move to the United States. This pattern fits with an overall picture of Mexican migration into the South that was led by the arrival of native-born Mexican Americans and foreign-born Mexican secondary migrants coming from traditional gateway states in the late 1980s and early 1990s, gradually shifting to include more direct migrants from Mexico by the late 1990s and early 2000s, as migration streams matured (Leach 2004; see also Bump, Lowell, and Pettersen 2005; Donato et al. 2008; Guthey 2001; Lacy 2007; Torres et al. 2003).

Although there is impressive heterogeneity among Hispanics/Latinos in the traditional South, overall statistics show that they are younger, more heavily male, more heavily foreign born, more heavily Mexican, and more disadvantaged in terms of human capital (education and English language ability) compared with those in traditional-immigrant receiving states, especially during the initial years of migration and settlement (Kochhar, Suro, and Tafuya 2005). Additionally, foreign-born Hispanics/Latinos in the traditional South tend to be more recently arrived and are more likely to lack legal status compared with those in traditional immigrant-receiving states (Passel and Cohn 2009; Marrow 2011; Saenz et al. 2003; Vásquez, Seales, and Marquardt 2008), two factors that contribute to low income levels and high poverty rates (Lacy 2007; Torres, Popke, and Hapke 2006).

FITTING INTO AND TRANSFORMING THE SOUTHERN RACIAL BINARY

The recent and rapid entry of substantial numbers of nonwhite/nonblack migrants into the traditional South is intriguing for many reasons. One is that southerners, especially those living in rural areas and small towns,⁴ are less familiar with post-1965 immigrants

4. Immigrants to the traditional South have settled disproportionately in metropolitan areas, preserving rural southerners' relative isolation from contemporary immigration even compared with their urban southern counterparts (see Bankston 2007; Eckes 2005; Elliott and Ionescu 2003; Kasarda and Johnson 2006; Neal and Bohon 2003).

and have lower levels of identification with immigrant histories of their own compared with their counterparts living in other parts of the country, especially those in historical immigrant gateways such as New York and Chicago. Second, the traditional South is the physical and symbolic homeland of African Americans, continuing to host the country's highest absolute and relative numbers of blacks (see Figure 6.2).⁵ Third, the traditional South is the region where the U.S. racial "binary," which has long served to divide superordinate whites from subordinate nonwhites, remains the strongest even today (McClain et al. 2006, 2007). Together, these features magnify the boundaries separating the region's two dominant groups—whites and blacks—both from each other and from newcomers, throwing into sharp relief the major questions scholars are asking about how contemporary nonwhite/nonblack migrants will become incorporated into, and potentially transform, the U.S. racial hierarchy.

One way to see how Hispanic newcomers, including Mexican migrants, are fitting into as well as challenging the South's strong racial binary is to examine how they are self-identifying themselves racially and ethnically, as well as how southern natives are externally identifying them. Another way is to examine how Hispanic newcomers, including Mexican migrants, interpret their social relations with whites and blacks, including the ways in which they perceive discrimination from either group. In this section I touch briefly on each pattern, drawing on 129 individual semistructured interviews and additional ethnographic research that I conducted between June 2003 and June 2004 in Bedford and Wilcox counties, pseudonyms for two nonmetropolitan new immigrant destination counties in eastern North Carolina, a subregion of the traditional rural South where poverty is acute and the black-white binary is extremely sharp (see Marrow 2008, 2009, 2011; Torres, Popke, and Hapke 2006). Seventy of the 129 interviews were conducted with Latin American immigrants of varying nationalities, in Spanish and English. Most were conducted with Mexicans ($N = 39$), but others were conducted with South Americans ($N = 16$), Central Americans ($N = 14$), and 1 Cuban ($N = 1$). Eighteen of the interviews were conducted with U.S.-born Hispanics, mostly Mexican and Puerto Rican Americans, in Spanish and English. Finally, 41 of the interviews were conducted with white ($N = 27$) and black ($N = 14$) "key native informants," in English, triangulating findings among the Hispanic respondents.

Hispanic Newcomers' Racial/Ethnic Identifications

In 2003–2004, Hispanic respondents in eastern North Carolina both self-identified and reported external identification by southern natives most strongly as something other than whites or blacks, particularly as Hispanics, Latinos, or people of some "other race" (see Table 6.5). This includes respondents who were not asked how they identify but who nonetheless used the terms Hispanic, *hispano*, or Latino frequently in their interviews (25.0 percent). It also includes respondents who self-identified as part of this group secondarily even when their primary identifications were by national origin (9.1 percent).

5. Figure 6.2 illustrates the southern "black belt," a region that stretches in an arc from Virginia to eastern Texas and that was originally named for its dark soils and position as the center of plantation cotton agriculture, but is now known for its predominant African American population, persistent poverty, high unemployment, low education, poor health, and high infant mortality (Wimberley and Morris 2002).




Figure 6.2 Percentage of Population, Black or African American (One Race), 2000 U.S. Census.

Source: Brewer, Cynthia A. and Trudy A. Suchan. 2001. "Mapping Census 2000: The Geography of U.S. Diversity." Census 2000 Special Reports (CENS01-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau (June). <http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/atlas/pdf/cens01-1.pdf> (last accessed December 17, 2009). Available in the public domain.

Table 6.5. Racial and Ethnic Self-Identifications of Hispanic Respondents, 2003–2004^a

PRIMARY SELF-IDENTIFICATION	N	%
Hispanic or Latino	26	29.5
Question not asked (but respondent uses the terms <i>Hispanic</i> , <i>hispano</i> , or Latino throughout interview)	22	25.0
Question not asked or response not specified (or respondent did not understand the question)	12	13.6
National Origin	8	9.1
(six Mexican, one Puerto Rican, one Argentine)		
Hispanic or Latino (but respondent thought he/she was white before migration or is perceived as white by U.S. natives)	7	8.0
Mestizo, Spanish, or Indian	6	6.8
White or Caucasian (and/or does not think Hispanic/Latino is a race)	3	3.4
Other (American, "a string of things," "it doesn't matter")	3	3.4
Black	1	1.1
Total	88	100.0

source: Author's interviews.

^aQuestions asked to gauge respondents' racial/ethnic self-identifications:

(1) How do you define yourself in terms of race or ethnicity? Like when you receive any forms here or if people ask you "What is your race or ethnicity?" how do you respond?

(2) What do other people think you are? If people think you are Hispanic, do you ever do anything to tell them that you are [ETHNIC GROUP]?

As illustrated by Ricardo and Noélla, an immigrant couple from Veracruz, Mexico, foreign-born respondents in this group have generally picked up such terms after migration, as available language to make sense of their new place as minorities in the South's racial hierarchy. Ricardo and Noélla reported how in eastern North Carolina, Latin American-origin newcomers from a variety of countries get aggregated into a larger "Hispanic" or "Spanish" grouping that is sometimes reduced even more simply to "Mexican." In this grouping, they are portrayed as racially distinct from whites, blacks, and Asians (e.g., "Chinese") alike:

INTERVIEWER: How do you define yourself in terms of race or ethnicity?

RICARDO: Well, in Mexico, we are Mexicans. And here, for everyone we are Hispanics. That's what they call people from Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, wherever . . . every one of them the same.

NOÉLLA: It's the only thing that they have on forms for race or ethnicity.

RICARDO: "Hispanic."

NOÉLLA: Hispanic, black, white, and sometimes they say "Chinese."

RICARDO: Or sometimes to play with us, and they say "Spanish" instead.

Yet some Hispanic respondents either self-identified or reported external identification by southern natives as whites. A few (approximately 3 percent) self-identified as

whites, adamantly resisting both the Hispanic/Latino and the black labels even when natives see them as such. Others (approximately 8 percent) either self-identified ethnically as Hispanics/Latinos and racially as whites (as did David, an immigrant from Medellín, Colombia) or thought that natives perceive them to be whites because of their light skin or hair color (as did Isabel García, a naturalized citizen from Buenos Aires, Argentina):

DAVID: I consider myself white. I don't think Hispanic is a race. That just indicates where we come from.

ISABEL GARCÍA: Until I open my mouth, people here think I'm American. Sometimes. And then when I open my mouth, many times they ask me if I'm German or Italian. But they don't think I'm Latin. Because I don't look like the stereotype of the Latin person.

Importantly, white racial identification emerged most strongly among light-skinned and more middle-class respondents from countries in South America and the Caribbean, whereas Hispanic and other racial identification emerged most strongly among dark-skinned and lower-class respondents from Mexico and Central America.⁶

By contrast, very few respondents identified or reported external identification by southern natives as blacks.⁷ Only one self-identified as black (Carmen, a dark-skinned Hispanic American of Puerto Rican, Panamanian, and African American ancestry), and only two others reported ever being identified by natives as black, with both varying over time. Lourdes, a Cuban American originally from Miami, said that whereas she was identified as white in majority-white Minneapolis and later as black in a majority-black locale in Tennessee, she is now identified as Mexican (and even referred to by the generic name "María") in eastern North Carolina, because "there are so many Mexicans here." Lidia, a legal permanent resident from Oaxaca, Mexico, reported being discriminated against by whites and called "black" when she first migrated to North Carolina in 1980, especially by lower-class natives. But Lidia said that this is something that has changed since because immigration into the area has increased and natives have become more familiar with and willing to acknowledge Hispanics as a distinct group.

Therefore, respondents' strongest internal and external identifications as Hispanics, Latinos, or people of some other race denote an early pattern of incorporation that exhibits some collective social distance from both whiteness and blackness, resisting full categorization into either of the traditional South's dominant binary racial categories. Yet respondents' stronger internal and external identifications as others and whites than as blacks also denote an early pattern of incorporation that exhibits greater collective social distance from blackness than whiteness. Although class and skin color did influence respondents' racial identifications, they generally

6. The former also identify more strongly as whites in U.S. Census data than the latter: at the national and North Carolina state levels (Ruggles et al. 2004, weighted data, author's analysis).

7. In the 2000 Census members of all Latin American immigrant groups in North Carolina identified more strongly as whites and "other race" than blacks, and the only two groups with high rates of black racial identification (Panamanians at 19.0 percent and Dominicans at 10.5 percent) make up a small portion of North Carolina's Hispanic population (Ruggles et al. 2004, weighted data, author's analysis).

out African Americans' lower class status relative to that of whites as a primary reason why blacks are responding more poorly to Hispanics:

NINA: There is a lot of black-Hispanic tension, and I've heard a lot about it. You know, really a lot of it comes from the fact that in the African American culture here you don't have a lot of students getting really high grades. It's not a part of the culture. There's some bad feelings on the part of African American students when Hispanic students start doing very well, which a lot of them already are.

INTERVIEWER: Jealousy, you mean?

NINA: Yes. Like I know one little [Hispanic] girl who was doing really well in school. She was getting 3s and 4s in everything [on her end-of-grade tests]. And she was beaten up by a black student in school. I really do think there is some jealousy. Of African American students feeling that these people are not even from here, they are only recently arrived, they don't even speak the language. And here they are, and doing better only after a little bit of time. They are doing well. And that's hard on African Americans. And I kind of see the same tension with the adults. You know, a lot of adults say that Hispanics are here to take their jobs and work for less. They say they're taking all of our jobs. And it's not really like that, but that's the feeling. The feeling of jealousy of having these people be new, being undocumented, not being from this country, and having their jobs. And so I do see conflict between Hispanics and African Americans.

In such competitive situations, negative tensions between minority groups carry great potential for misinterpretation as group rejection (Rockquemore 2002) or even discrimination (Kasinitz et al. 2008), such as when a college-educated undocumented Colombian respondent working in a textile mill in Bedford county said, "I feel the blacks don't like us. And that it is worse than with the whites," or when a poor undocumented Guatemalan respondent working in a food processing plant in Wilcox county said that "the black race does not like Hispanics very much because they think that we are taking away their jobs," reporting that this thing "you could even call racism, right?" makes him feel "humiliated" and "made fun of" by some blacks. In turn, these perceptions of competition-induced rejection and discrimination can foster resentment, stereotyping, and distancing against blacks.

Second, Hispanic newcomers reported experiencing discrimination and exclusion not just because of class-based competition or along a *vertical skin color axis* along which white natives can mark them as racially inferior, but also along other dimensions that, when viewed together, comprise a separate *horizontal (non)citizenship axis* along which both white and black natives can mark and ostracize them as undeserving civic and cultural "outsiders" (Kim 1999; see also De Genova 2006). That is, in 2003–2004, when Hispanic respondents spoke of prejudice and discrimination, they did so in terms of civic and cultural belonging (i.e., nonracial exclusion along lines such as English language ability, class status, personal appearance, nativity, real or presumed legal status, and so forth) as well as race and skin color (i.e., racial exclusion). In fact, in many instances Hispanic respondents only implicated their physical features or skin colors as factors in how they experience discrimination insofar as such traits serve to denote or signal civic and cultural "outsiderness" instead.

For example, many Hispanic respondents reported being stopped by law enforcement officials for "driving while Mexican" or "driving while Hispanic." Although they understood that these officials often identify them as Hispanic according to their physical appearances, they thought that this is primarily because their Hispanic features are associated with probable lack of legal status, which is something that ultimately serves to ostracize them along civic and cultural lines as undeserving foreigners instead. As Jiménez (2008, 2010) argues, in the contemporary era of unprecedented Mexican immigration, race has become so tightly conflated with nativity and citizenship that having dark skin, indigenous features, or Spanish surnames often serves the purpose of implying that Hispanics are foreign born and likely also undocumented, even if they are U.S.-born citizens. By this logic, Hispanic newcomers in eastern North Carolina are undergoing a complex process of racialization, yet it is one in which they perceived that "nonracial" discrimination (particularly along the lines of noncitizenship) is most important, with "racial" discrimination playing a compounding role.

Furthermore, Hispanic respondents often perceived blacks to be the worst perpetrators of this horizontal civic and cultural exclusion. Merced and Octavio, an undocumented immigrant couple from Sinaloa, Mexico, expressed great frustration with local blacks who "ignore them" when they attempt to communicate in English, whereas they noted that whites "try to help" them more:

MERCED: Even though some blacks do understand you, they say they don't.

OCTAVIO: Right. They say, "I don't understand what you are saying. What do you mean?" And if there is someone around who speaks a little Spanish, they'll say, "Wait a moment." But if there isn't, the bad thing is that they will just ignore you. They'll say, "I don't understand you."

MERCED: Exactly! It's even happened to me! Sometimes I go up to our English teacher, and I'll ask him, "How do you say X thing?" And he says, "You say it like this." And then I say it back to him like he said it to me, and he tells me, "Yes, you've got it!" So I ask him, "How come some black people tell me they don't understand what I am saying to them?"

OCTAVIO: Almost the majority of *gringos* ask me to talk, and they will try to understand me. And they help me. I will say it, and they will try to understand and if there is a problem, they will correct it and say, "No, say it this way." However, there are other people who make fun of you. There is some difference [between whites and blacks] there.

Like Merced and Octavio, other Hispanic respondents perceived that whites are more "open-minded" toward them and their "foreign" cultures than blacks, whom they perceived as "staying more separate" and attempting to exclude Hispanics more strongly. Raquel, a 1.5-generation undocumented youth, originally from Honduras, who dropped out of her high school in Tennessee after the tenth grade, recalled severe rejection by black schoolmates who ostracized her according to her foreign dress and personal appearance, compared with whites, who came to form her close circle of friends. Laura, an immigrant from Chihuahua, Mexico, thought that there is "more communication and common interests" between Hispanic newcomers and whites than between Hispanic newcomers and blacks, perhaps because "whites try to strike up more conversation with Hispanics" to get to know more about them and their backgrounds,

whereas “blacks, well, not as much.” Likewise, Stephanie, a legal permanent resident from Guanajuato, Mexico, thought that “Hispanics and the white Americans get along better” than Hispanics and blacks do “because the blacks put up a barrier that you can’t get across. Maybe because of their color. Because they feel like they are another race. And they just want to preserve their group.”

Even when Hispanics did not perceive whites as open-minded, they did not necessarily see blacks as more so. Eugenio, a 1.5-generation undocumented youth from Oaxaca, Mexico, thought that although whites ostracize Hispanics as “dirty” and underserving foreigners, blacks do so even more strongly. Here Eugenio tapped not only into the acute threat of socioeconomic disenfranchisement that lower-class African Americans feel in the face of rising immigration, but also into their sense that they, like whites, are the kind of “real Americans” that Hispanics are not:

EUGENIO: They always look at you and they say, “Well, you know, he doesn’t speak English.” Because I’ve been in restaurants and I’ve had black people sitting next to me, or white people. And they’re just talking fast. They just keep on yapping, and yapping, yapping . . . “Look at that. He’s dirty. And all these Hispanics come and steal our jobs.” And this and that. Well, one time I turned around, I said, “Excuse me, what did you say? Because I couldn’t hear you exactly. And I would like to hear what you said again.” Those people just stood up and left. Because that’s what I like doing. I like sitting down. I don’t say a word, and I want to hear what people say about us. That’s how I know what problems Hispanics have in this country. They’ll sit there and, man, they’ll just keep on talking trash about you.

INTERVIEWER: This negative treatment, this talking trash—do you think Hispanics get it mostly from white Americans or black Americans?

EUGENIO: They get it mostly from blacks.

INTERVIEWER: And why?

EUGENIO: Honestly, I don’t know. Like one time, during Hurricane Floyd, all the lights went out. And the Salvation Army, or the soldiers would come over here to Bedford Mobile Home Park with dump trucks. And they would drop clothes off here, or water, or canned foods. In the center of the Mobile Home Park. And I overheard a conversation that a black lady had. She said, “You know, look at ‘em. They come over here to our country, to our land, steal our jobs, steal our money. And now they even want to steal our needs [*i.e., donated relief items*]. Those needs are for us, the Americans.” You know, I was just listening to that. They were saying this and that about us.

Just why these Hispanic respondents perceived greater horizontal civic and cultural exclusion, which they interpreted as discrimination, from blacks than whites is still unclear. Opinion data show that lifelong southern blacks support *less* restrictive immigration policies and *less* exclusionary policies toward unauthorized immigrants than do lifelong southern whites; however, data also show lifelong southern blacks espousing more particularistic ideas about what it takes to be American than lifelong southern whites (Griffin and McFarland 2007) and blacks exhibiting greater concern about undocumented immigrants than whites in Virginia (Vallas and Zimmerman 2007). Opinion data from Durham, North Carolina, also show that blacks exhibit *fewer* negative stereotypes toward Hispanics than Hispanics exhibit toward them (McClain

et al. 2006), which may be consistent with my observation that blacks in eastern North Carolina were not aware of how exclusively Hispanics perceived them to be acting. Perhaps blacks in eastern North Carolina were simply unaware of how poorly they were treating Hispanics—particularly if the characteristics associated with noncitizenship, rather than aligning Hispanics and blacks together as “collective blacks” at the bottom of the regional racial hierarchy, exacerbate feelings of competition instead. Or perhaps Hispanics’ antiblack stereotypes or observations of whites’ stigmatization of blacks were also flavoring their interpretations of whites and blacks’ behaviors, leading them to judge those of blacks as more harsh.

Regardless, Hispanic newcomers perceived negative treatment from blacks and described it as “unexpected,” in contrast to perceiving more “surprisingly” pleasant interpersonal relations with whites, especially when they harbored initial expectations of encountering significant discrimination from whites rather than blacks. For instance, one of the things that most surprised Inés, an undocumented immigrant from Medellín, Colombia, was encountering discrimination by blacks against Hispanic newcomers, not by whites against either blacks or Hispanics. And despite having heard about the Ku Klux Klan and anti-immigrant vigilante activity on the U.S.–Mexico border before migrating to the United States, Mauro, an undocumented immigrant from Guatemala City, Guatemala, reported being surprised to encounter interpersonal discrimination not from whites, but from a black coworker who refused to return his smiles and greetings each morning at work. By contrast, “From what I have gotten to know of white Americans, they have always been very friendly. I have never felt any discrimination from them.” These perceptions of horizontal exclusion by African Americans can, like those arising from economically induced competition, foster resentment, stereotyping, and distancing in return.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the reasons why Hispanics/Latinos, including Mexican migrants, have settled in the traditional U.S. South over the past few decades. After centuries of lagging economically and demographically behind other regions of the country, the U.S. South has become increasingly economically integrated within the national and global economies since World War II, and new patterns of both internal and international migration reflect the region’s flourishing dynamism and opportunity. Key economic and political developments in Mexico and other parts of the United States have further shaped migration patterns among Hispanics/Latinos, especially Mexicans, by providing them with incentives to leave (or avoid) traditional settlement states and cities and also by making traditional southern states look more appealing as destinations. Together these trends have dramatically expanded the Hispanic/Latino and immigrant populations of traditional southern states, fundamentally changing the face of what was arguably once the most culturally and racially “settled” region of the United States.

I have also provided a brief overview of Hispanic newcomers’ racial/ethnic identifications and patterns of intergroup relations in eastern North Carolina in 2003–2004, with the purpose of illuminating a few key points about how Hispanic newcomers might become incorporated into, and potentially transform, the heretofore binary

southern racial hierarchy. First, there are some early signs that Hispanic newcomers are self-identifying and being externally identified by natives in ways that elude the U.S. South's two dominant racial categories of "white" and "black." As Vásquez, Seales, and Marquardt (2008) note, these are potential signs of a "subversion of a long-standing biracial order" in the traditional South (29). Nonetheless, there are also early signs that Hispanic newcomers are self-identifying and being externally identified by natives in ways that might simply reconstitute the southern binary racial order over time—yet this time according to a new "black/nonblack" divide in which most Hispanics may come to be included as nonblacks (Gans 1999; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Lee and Bean 2007; Marrow 2009, 2011; Yancey 2003).

Second, some very real and disturbing tensions have emerged between blacks and Hispanics in both urban and rural areas of African Americans' regional homeland (LeDuff 2000; Marrow 2011; Mohl 2002; McClain 2006, 2007; Schmid 2003; Swans 2006a, 2006b; Stuesse 2009; Torres, Popke, and Hapke 2006), although, of course, not all black-Hispanic relations are conflict ridden nor are all white-Hispanic relations smooth. Here I have chosen to focus on Hispanics' perceptions of discrimination by blacks because they illustrate how immigration has altered the contours of discrimination in this symbolic region, expanding them outward from a historical orientation around racial differences in skin color that have served to separate whites from blacks to include new differences around citizenship and civic and cultural belonging that now serve to separate both whites and blacks from newcomers, too (De Genova 2006; Kim 1999). In the contemporary multiracial South, discrimination takes on multiple meanings and dimensions, and it is not something that Hispanic newcomers in eastern North Carolina felt is solely racial or originates solely from whites.

Nonetheless, anti-immigrant sentiment has increased throughout the South since 2003–2004 (Ansley and Sheffer 2009; Lippard and Gallagher 2011; Marrow 2011; Odem and Lacy 2009), and new efforts to build coalitions among blacks, Hispanics, immigrants, and progressive whites have emerged in response—both to combat rising nativism and racism among whites and to temper simmering conflict between blacks and Hispanics. Perhaps these trends will lead Hispanics, including Mexican migrants, to perceive greater discrimination from whites in the future, particularly if they also perceive blacks to begin exhibiting more solidarity and empathy rather than exclusion in the context of their everyday interactions (and not just in elite coalition-building projects) than they did in 2003–2004.

CHAPTER 7



Indigenous Mexican Migrants

Jonathan Fox

University of California, Santa Cruz

INTRODUCTION¹

In the United States, when the terms "multiethnic," "multicultural," and "multiracial" are used to refer to Mexican migrants, they usually refer exclusively to relationships between Mexicans and *other* national origin groups. Yet Mexican society is itself multiethnic and multiracial. From an indigenous rights perspective, the Mexican nation includes many distinct *peoples*. To take the least ambiguous indicator of ethnic difference, more than one in ten Mexicans comes from a family in which an indigenous language is spoken (Serrano Carreto et al., 2003). Increasingly, indigenous Mexican community activists in the United States are now *trilingual*. For some who immigrated as children or teenagers, Spanish is neither their first nor their second language. Yet in the United States, most scholars, health clinics, civil rights groups, cultural workers, labor organizers, and funding agencies treat Mexicans as ethnically homogeneous. This unspoken assumption provokes both invisibility and visibility; whereas many indigenous migrants submerge their cultures and identities, others "come out" in defense of respect for racial equality and cultural difference.

The Mexican migrant population in the United States increasingly reflects the ethnic diversity of Mexican society, but our conceptual frameworks have yet to catch up. This essay explores a series of puzzles about collective identity formation that emerge once one recognizes ethnic difference among Mexican migrants. The first issue is that both Mexican migrant and Mexican indigenous collective identities complicate widely

1. This chapter is a substantially revised and updated version of Fox (2006). Some sections draw from Fox and Rivera-Salgado (2004) and Fox (2004). This work was inspired by long-term conversations with Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, Rufino Domínguez Santos, Romaldo Juan Gutiérrez Cortés, Odilia Romero, and Leoncio Vásquez of the Binational Front of Indigenous Organizations (FIOB, formerly known as the Oaxacan Indigenous Binational Front). For discussions of the FIOB, see, among others, Bacon (2006), Domínguez Santos (2004a, 2004b), Hernández Díaz (2002), Martínez Saldaña (2004), Ramírez Romero (2003), Rivera-Salgado (1999, 2002), and Velasco (2002, 2005a, 2005b), as well as <http://www.fiob.org> (including *El Tequio* magazine). Thanks also for conversations with Xóchitl Chavez, Sylvia Escárcega, Martha García Ortega, María Dolores París Pombo, and Lynn Stephen.

