The Other Latinos

Central and South Americans in the United States

José Luis Falconi and José Antonio Mazzotti, editors

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Who Are the *Other* Latinos, and Why?*

Helen B. Marrow

Introduction

Latinos are receiving unprecedented attention in the United States. From population estimates to political elections to commercial advertisements, U.S. natives are becoming more aware of the powerful force that Latinos represent. In addition, 2000 U.S. Census data illustrated a remarkable increase not just in the existing Latino populations (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and their descendants), but in "other" or "new" Latino populations as well (Dominicans and Central and South Americans coming from Spanish Latin America) (see Logan 2001, 2002; Suro 2002; Suro and Singer 2002).

Because of these substantial increases in population, new groups pose significant challenges for the way we currently conceive of the Latino population in the United States. No longer does being Latino in Miami mean being Cuban, being Latino in California mean being Mexican, or being Latino in New York mean being Puerto Rican. As Logan informs us:

> The New Latinos bring a new level of complexity to the rapidly changing complexion of ethnic America.... An outstanding characteristic of the New Latinos is their diversity. Not only do they come from many different countries. More important is that they have a wide range of social and economic backgrounds, some better prepared for the U.S. labor market than any of the older Hispanic groups, and others much less successful. The scale of immigration from less traditional Hispanic sources brings new and less known groups into the United States. Within ten years, we need to become as aware of Dominicans, Salvadorans, and Colombians—people with very different backgrounds and trajectories—as we are of Puerto Ricans and Cubans (2001: 1, 11).

In addition to modifying the content of and boundaries around "Hispanic/Latino origin ethnicity" (as the U.S. Census calls it), these new Latino groups will join other immigrants in challenging and modifying the powerful black-white binary that has predominated in the United States' historical and contemporary understanding of race (Cornell and Hartmann 1997; Davis 1991; Degler 1986; Harris 1964; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000; Omi and Winant 1994).[1]

In this essay I take a look at how new Latinos—as well as some officially non-Latino groups who frequently come up against external classification as Latinos, such as Brazilians, Haitians, Guyanese, and Portuguese—identified themselves in terms of race and Hispanic origin ethnicity on the 1990 U.S. Census.[2] These data illuminate some of the ways in which new Latinos challenge Hispanic/Latino identity as well as American visions of whiteness and blackness. Examination of these identifications underscores the diversity that new Latinos and other immigrants are bringing with them to the United States, forcing us to rethink the kind of quick-and-easy definitions of who Latinos are that we see in official census and other data or attempt to envision for ourselves. In official data, all immigrants from Spanish-speaking Latin America (and sometimes Spain) become, automatically upon their arrival in the United States, Latinos, while immigrants from other countries do not. This is a first descriptive answer to the question "Who Are the *Other* Latinos, and Why?" based on official U.S. definitions of the group. But this is not the way most immigrants from Spanish Latin America or Spain think of themselves when they enter the United States, nor is it the direction in which many expect their long-term trajectories to go. Plus, it overlooks the ways in which U.S. natives frequently conceptualize other immigrant groups inside the boundaries of Hispanic/Latino identity.

Furthermore, official data and our own mental conceptions of who Latinos are gloss over the complex ways in which different immigrant groups can *unbecome* as well as *become* Latinos over time and/or generations, not to mention what the socioeconomic and political consequences are of doing either. At base there is a very simple answer to the question of which immigrants *are* or *become* U.S. Latinos: none of them do. As Rumbaut writes:

> The terms Hispanic and Latino . . . are recent . . . neologisms . . . that seek to lump together millions of U.S. residents, immigrants or not, who trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking societies of "Latin" America (a term, itself in many ways a misnomer, promoted by the French during their stint of imperial control over Mexico in the 19th Century). The vast region thus labeled encompasses extraordinarily diverse peoples from many countries whose histories are obliterated when they are forced into a one size fits all panethnic category; and the vast majority of people labeled Hispanic or Latino in the United States do not, in fact, identify themselves by either of these supernational terms. Today's polemics about the "politically correct" usage of "Latino" or "Hispanic" ignore the more fundamental point that such labels are historically and empirically incorrect (1996: 1).

Nevertheless, I discuss the ways in which immigrants *are* or *become* Latinos in order to give descriptive due to the incredible institutional and public power that both official U.S. definitions and U.S. natives' current ideas of Hispanics/Latinos wield over incoming immigrant populations from Latin America. Since identity formation is a two-way process (Cornell and Hartmann 1997)—that is, if we are to take seriously the idea that identity is as much in the eye of the beholder as it is in the eye of the beholden—the terms Hispanic and Latino need to be understood as fundamental axes that inform both U.S. data and public opinion today, and therefore structure the current and future positions of new immigrants from Latin America and their descendants in the United States.

After analyzing new Latinos' responses to the 1990 U.S. Census' race and Hispanic-origin ethnicity questions, I will contrast two case studies of second-generation new Latino groups: Dominicans[3] (an official Hispanic/Latino national-origin group) and Brazilians[4] (a national-origin group that faces significant external identification as Hispanic/Latino despite being officially considered non-Hispanic/Latino). These two groups illustrate the complex ways in which new Latino groups (1) encounter external identification by U.S. natives as Hispanics/Latinos and (2) employ their own self-identifications and incoming conceptions of race and ethnicity to determine different paths of incorporation against the backdrop of homogenizing U.S. ethno-racial categories.

New Latinos and the U.S. Census: Hispanic/Latino Origin Ethnicity

Since 1977, the U.S. Census has complied with the official definition of Hispanic developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In 1977, the OMB officially defined Hispanic-origin ethnicity as pertaining to any "person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South Amer-

ican, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race" (U.S. OMB 1995). This happened because a coalition of Mexican American and Puerto Rican leaders, riding on the heels of the American Civil Rights movement, had just been able to successfully couch claims of racial discrimination against these two groups in language that resembled claims recently made by African Americans. In response, OMB officials looked around for a term that could refer to and identify this new (racialized) political minority group, eventually extracting "Hispanic" from the dictionary as a term that could do so under a broad rubric of "Spanish origin or culture"—what Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in the United States were deemed to have in common (Anderson and Fienberg 1999; Chávez 1991; Oboler 1995; Saragoza et al. 1998; Toro 1998).

Furthermore, "Spanish origin or culture" came about as the political group itself was conceptualized. That is, there was little need to consider defining the group by "Latin American origin or culture," since Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans were already *native* U.S. groups at the time (Puerto Rico and parts of Mexico had become U.S. territory long before the 1970s), and since immigration from Latin America had not yet reached the high levels we are familiar with today (with the exception of Cuban refugees). Another example is that the group was defined by its Spanish and not Iberian origin or culture, which is reported to stem from a controversial decision to exclude the Portuguese from the Hispanic category in the 1970s. At a 1973 conference at Harvard University, Portuguese leaders and activists voted for inclusion in the Hispanic minority category (a debate under way at the time) in the belief that this classification would provide badly needed government resources for their community in the same way it was supposed to have done for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. But on the basis of one differing opinion by an influential Portuguese American academic, ultimately the Portuguese were not included within its rubric (personal communications, Miguel Moniz and Onésimo Almeida, Brown University, March 2002). Had the decision been made to officially define the Portuguese as Hispanics in the 1970s, Brazilians and immigrants from other Portuguese-speaking countries would likely be considered U.S. Hispanics/Latinos today. But the decision went to "Spanish origin or culture" instead.

With respect to new Latino groups, the two most important things about OMB's above definition of Hispanics are its *American origins* and its *racial basis*. First, the term Hispanic is made-in-the-U.S.A. and bears little or no relation to the experiences and self-identifications of new Latino groups (despite the ways they may use terms related to it in their home countries).

Second, it became racialized from its conception as a political category originally meant to define and protect a racially stigmatized and discriminated group of *native-born* Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in the United States, because the Hispanic pan-ethnic label is applied from the outside to individuals and groups who, above all, "look" a certain way in the United States and therefore are actively discriminated against (or assumed to be discriminated against) on the basis of their physical appearance.

But as immigration from all parts of Latin America has burgeoned over the past three decades, more and more immigrants have faced potential incorporation into the Hispanic minority category as its "Spanish origin or culture" definition has expanded to include, more or less, all immigrant groups "from Spanish-speaking countries." In other words, having started out as a category intended to speak to the *racialized* experiences of *native-born* Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in the mid-twentieth century, it has undergone a fundamental transformation such that it now denotes (to many U.S. natives and self-identified Hispanics alike) a connection to some Latin American *immigrant* experience, whether past or present. And so it may not be surprising that much of the confusion around Hispanic pan-ethnic identity arises not only from the group's association with low socioeconomic status and racial discrimination in the U.S. context, but also from the twist that persons of non-Spanish or multiple heritages can be born in Spanish-speaking countries, or that persons of Spanish origin or culture can be born in non-Spanish-speaking ones. For these reasons, new Latinos who come to the United States from countries with complex immigration, multiracial, and multicultural histories of their own (as most immigrants from Latin America do) do not identify with the Hispanic category in any easy or singular way.

To illustrate, Table 1 displays selected responses to the Hispanic origin ethnicity question in the 1990 Census. Included in the table are all of the officially Hispanic immigrant groups (including Spaniards but excluding Puerto Ricans since Puerto Ricans are not officially considered immigrants in the United States). Also included in the table are several officially non-Hispanic immigrant groups who exhibit the closest relationships to Hispanic origin ethnicity in the data. In 1990, Cubans and Mexicans identified themselves predominantly as Hispanics. This finding is easily explained by the fact that the "Mexican/Mexican-American/Chicano," "Puerto Rican," and "Cuban" subcategories were listed individually under the Hispanic-origin ethnicity question in 1990. Several of the other officially Hispanic immigrant groups identified themselves predominantly as "other Hispanic," too, including Hondurans, Colombians, and Guatemalans.

Table 1. Hispanic Origin Ethnicity Identification, Selected Immigrant Groups, 1990 U.S. Census[a]

	Detailed Hispanic Origin Ethnicity Response					
National Origin	Not Hispanic	Mexican/ Mexican-American/ Chicano	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Other Hispanic–Hispanic Response[b]	Other Hispanic–Non-Hispanic Response[c]
Guyana	97.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	**2.2**
Philippines	94.2	0.3	0.1	0.0	2.9	**2.4**
Cape Verde	95.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.1	**3.3**
Mozambique	94.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	**4.4**
Haiti	93.4	0.1	0.2	0.1	1.7	**4.5**
Angola	93.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	**6.2**
Portugal (+ Azores/Madeira)	87.7	0.4	0.2	0.0	1.8	**10.0**
Suriname	87.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	**12.5**
Belize	**68.1**	3.3	0.2	0.0	**10.3**	**18.2**
Brazil	**68.4**	0.3	0.3	0.1	**7.8**	**23.1**
Panama	**39.7**	1.4	1.8	0.3	56.7	0.2
Dominica	**29.3**	0.2	1.4	.3	68.8	0.0
Spain	**23.7**	2.1	1.2	2.6	69.7	0.7
Venezuela	**21.2**	1.2	0.4	0.9	76.0	0.3
Paraguay	**20.2**	0.0	0.2	0.0	78.7	0.9
Argentina	**16.4**	0.6	0.3	0.2	82.3	0.2
Uruguay	**13.5**	0.5	0.5	0.1	85.1	0.2
Costa Rica	**8.8**	1.5	0.3	0.6	88.7	0.0
Chile	**8.3**	1.1	0.0	0.2	90.0	0.3
Bolivia	**7.1**	1.5	0.7	0.0	90.6	0.1
Honduras	**6.1**	2.0	0.3	0.3	91.3	0.0
Peru	**5.9**	1.2	0.4	0.1	92.2	0.2
Colombia	**3.2**	0.4	0.2	0.2	95.9	0.1
Ecuador	**2.9**	0.7	0.5	0.1	95.7	0.1
Guatemala	**2.6**	3.0	0.1	0.1	94.0	0.5
Dominican Republic	**1.7**	0.2	1.1	0.1	96.8	0.2
Nicaragua	**1.6**	1.3	0.1	0.1	96.9	0.0
El Salvador	**1.1**	2.5	0.0	0.0	96.2	0.1
Cuba	**2.1**	0.2	0.2	96.4	1.0	0.0
Mexico	**1.1**	97.4	0.1	0.0	1.4	0.0

a Included in this analysis are all foreign-born persons. Statistical Directive No. 15 defines Hispanic as a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race (U.S. OMB 1995).

b Includes all persons who marked the "other Spanish/Hispanic" category and who also wrote in more detailed Hispanic origins such as: (some) Spanish, Hispanic, Latin, Latin/Central/South/Spanish American, Criollo, Central/South /Spanish/ Meso American Indian, Mestizo, Tejano, Californio, Nuevo Mexicano, a name of a Spanish-speaking Latin American country (i.e. Dominican).

c Includes all persons who marked "other Spanish/Hispanic" but then wrote-in a detailed response that the U.S. census considers "non-Hispanic," such as Brazilian, Filipino, Guyanese, Portuguese, or Basque. For persons who filled out the long-form census questionnaire (5% of census takers), the 1990 Census recoded these responses as "not Spanish/Hispanic" instead of "other Spanish/Hispanic." The 2000 Census recoded all of these

However, significant proportions of some officially Hispanic immigrant groups identified themselves as "not Hispanic," including Venezuelans and immigrant groups from the Southern Cone (Paraguayans, Argentines, Uruguayans, and Chileans). Members of these groups come from countries which boast complex histories of European, Asian, and Middle Eastern immigration and whose populations tend to think of themselves as largely white. Significant proportions of some other groups also identified as "not Hispanic," including Dominicans (coming from the country Dominica in the West Indies, not the Dominican Republic), Panamanians (coming from a country that has experienced much U.S. geopolitical involvement during the twentieth century, and consequently reporting a high degree of English monolingualism relative to other Latin American immigrants (Rumbaut 1996)), and Spaniards (coming from the one European country officially defined as Hispanic because of its "Spanish origin or culture"). The implications of this are important for researchers who use Hispanic/Latino-origin ethnicity data in the U.S. Census to analyze Latin-American origin populations in the United States: these data *do not include* many of the immigrants coming from Latin American countries, even its Spanish-speaking ones (including approximately one fifth of immigrants coming from Paraguay and Venezuela and two fifths of those coming from Panama!).

Even more interesting are the complex relationships that officially non-Hispanic immigrant groups such as Brazilians, Belizeans, the Portuguese, Angolans, and Haitians claimed to Hispanic-origin ethnicity in 1990. Although they were not included in OMB's official definition of such ethnicity, 7.8% of immigrants from Brazil and 10.3% of immigrants from Belize checked the "other Hispanic" ethnic origin box on the 1990 Census, and then wrote in some type of detailed response beside their checks that the census definition considers to be Hispanic. Moreover, another 23.1% of immigrants from Brazil, 18.2% from Belize, 12.5% from Suriname, and 10.0% from Portugal checked the "other Hispanic" origin ethnicity box on the census, but then wrote in some type of detailed response beside their checks that the census definition considers to be non-Hispanic (such as Brazilian or Basque).[5] These responses confirm that there is no real or definitive boundary separating Hispanic from non-Hispanic immigrant groups in the United States, despite OMB's official definition. Even when presented with a definition of Hispanic-origin ethnicity and the groups it supposedly includes, some members of officially Hispanic groups identified themselves outside of it and some members of officially non-Hispanic groups identified within it. In particular, these identifications single out Brazilians and

boundary of Hispanic-origin ethnicity in the United States most closely. (Brazilians and Belizeans are, therefore, the most likely candidates to become incorporated into the boundaries of Hispanic-origin ethnicity over time, if any non-Hispanic immigrant groups do in fact face this possibility.)

Yet OMB's official definition of Hispanic origin ethnicity works to solidify the official boundary between Hispanic and non-Hispanic immigrant groups: 1990 Census officials kept those responses made by individuals they considered to be Hispanics within the Hispanic category, but moved some (but not all) of those responses made by individuals considered to be non-Hispanics outside of the Hispanic category.[6] Because Brazilians and Belizeans are the two national-origin immigrant groups that straddle the boundary of Hispanic origin ethnicity in these data most closely, they were the two groups most affected by this strategy. In 1990, census officials moved 23.1% of Brazilian immigrants' responses and 18.2% of Belizean immigrants' responses (and so forth and so on with the responses of other non-Hispanic immigrant groups listed in Table 1) to "not Hispanic" on the long-form questionnaire that my sample data capture.

In what regards new Latino groups' identifications on future U.S. censuses, an important change must be noted. In 1997, the Office of Management and Budget incorporated the label "Latino" into its official definition of "Hispanic-origin ethnicity." Thus, as of the 2000 Census, a Hispanic/Latino is also defined as any "person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central and South American, and other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race," and "The term, 'Spanish Origin,' can be used in addition to 'Hispanic or Latino'" (U.S. OMB 1997). Going even further, 2000 U.S. Census officials "cleaned" *all* "other Hispanic/Latino" responses that were accompanied by detailed write-in responses considered to be non-Hispanic/Latino (such as Brazilian or Filipino), and this time they did so on *both* the short-form and long-form census questionnaires (Suro 2002: 4). In short, the artificial boundary between Hispanics/Latinos and non-Hispanics/Latinos was even more strongly enforced in 2000 than the artificial boundary between Hispanics and non-Hispanics had been in 1990!

New Latinos and the U.S. Census: Race

At this time new Latinos face no official rules or regulations with respect to their racial identifications on the U.S. Census. In other words, the census does not yet dictate the race of Latin American immigrants. Instead, individual Latin American immigrants are instructed to self-identify their race however they would like—choosing from the official white, black, Native

American, Asian/Pacific Islander, or "other race" categories in 1990, and choosing one or more of these racial categories as of 2000, following the U.S. Census's move to recognizing multiraciality (Nobles 2000; Perlmann

Table 2. Racial Identification, Selected Immigrant Groups, 1990 U.S. Census[a]

	Detailed Race Response				
National Origin	White	Black/Negro	American Indian Races	Asian/Pacific Islander Races	Other Race[b]
Guyana	4.2	69.0	2.0	22.7	2.1
Philippines	5.1	0.6	0.1	94.2	0.1
Cape Verde	16.0	23.9	0.2	0.8	59.1
Mozambique	45.3	15.3	0.0	33.7	5.8
Haiti	1.9	97.3	0.0	0.5	0.3
Angola	63.5	29.5	0.4	0.0	6.5
Portugal (+ Azores/Madeira)	98.8	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.6
Suriname	31.8	30.3	0.5	32.2	5.2
Belize	12.3	73.6	0.9	1.7	11.5
Brazil	82.7	1.7	0.0	1.8	13.7
Panama	45.1	35.2	0.4	1.6	17.7
Dominica	21.9	52.2	0.8	0.1	25.1
Spain	88.4	2.8	0.0	0.8	7.9
Venezuela	77.8	1.9	0.3	1.2	18.8
Paraguay	75.8	0.9	0.2	1.0	22.1
Argentina	87.7	0.4	0.0	0.6	11.2
Uruguay	82.9	0.1	0.0	0.9	16.1
Costa Rica	57.4	10.1	0.1	1.1	31.2
Chile	75.4	0.1	0.3	0.3	23.8
Bolivia	69.6	0.4	0.2	0.7	29.1
Honduras	47.1	9.4	0.2	0.2	43.0
Peru	57.0	1.0	0.6	2.3	39.2
Colombia	63.8	2.0	0.3	0.5	33.4
Ecuador	50.7	1.7	0.3	0.7	46.6
Guatemala	41.0	1.8	0.5	2.0	54.8
Dominican Republic	27.1	27.6	0.8	0.6	44.0
Nicaragua	59.5	2.0	0.5	0.5	37.6
El Salvador	38.7	1.0	0.3	0.7	59.3
Cuba	84.0	3.1	0.0	0.3	12.6
Mexico	44.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	54.6

a Included in this analysis are all foreign-born persons. See U.S. OMB (1997) for official definitions of major U.S. racial groups.

b Includes all persons who marked the "other race" category and who did *not* write in a more detailed origin that could be recoded under one of the previous designated racial groups. In general, "other race" includes all persons who checked "other race" and then wrote in more detailed Hispanic origin responses, as well as non-Hispanic origin responses such as Brazilian and Filipino. I was not able to analyze race responses by absence or presence of detailed write-in entries, because the responses were already grouped together in my PUMS sample.

Source: 1990 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), weighted data (Bureau of the Census 1992a, 1992b).

2000; Perlmann and Waters 2002). Table 2 illustrates selected responses to the race question in the 1990 Census (for ease of comparison, the same national-origin groups listed in Table 1 are listed again in Table 2.)

Latin American immigrants exhibit a wide range of racial identifications on the 1990 U.S. Census. To simplify the responses in the table, note the following four patterns. First, certain national-origin immigrant groups self-identify more as "other race" than others. The national-origin groups where at least one-third of persons checked "other race" include Salvadorans (59.3%), Mexicans (54.6%), Guatemalans (54.8%), Ecuadorians (46.6%), Dominicans (44.0%), Hondurans (43.0%), Peruvians (39.2%), Nicaraguans (37.6%), and Colombians (33.4%). These groups correspond very roughly to the Latin American countries exhibiting the highest indigenous populations in Latin America (with the exception of Bolivia) and middle Central America.

Second, almost all of the Latin American immigrant groups identified most frequently and most strongly as white, but certain national-origin groups self-identified more as white than others. The national-origin groups where at least 70% of persons checked "white" include Argentines (87.7%), Cubans (84.0%), Uruguayans (82.9%), Brazilians (82.7%), Venezuelans (77.8%), Paraguayans (75.8%), and Chileans (75.4%). These "disproportionately white" national-origin groups correspond roughly to the Latin American countries that have exhibited the highest historical rates of European immigration, especially in South America and its Southern Cone.

Third, some of the Latin American immigrant groups identified more as black than others. These groups include immigrants coming from: Haiti (97.3%), Guyana (69.0%), Belize (73.6%), Panama (35.2%), Suriname (30.3%), the Dominican Republic (27.6%), and even Costa Rica (10.1%) and Honduras (9.4%). These "disproportionately black" national-origin groups correspond roughly to the Latin American countries that had the greatest historical experience with the Atlantic slave trade—although notable exceptions include Brazil, Colombia, and Cuba, where many fewer U.S.-bound immigrants self-identified as black relative to what would be expected of the general populations in those countries (see Margolis 1994).

Finally, there is a rough but visible and important correlation between the national-origin groups who identified most strongly as some Hispanic-origin ethnicity (Table 1) and also as "other race" (Table 2). As many researchers and census officials have noted, this correlation fundamentally challenges the U.S. Census view of race and Hispanic-origin ethnicity as *separate* facets of one's identity, because it suggests that many members of these immigrant groups consider their "race" to be the same thing as or

something similar to their Hispanic-origin ethnicity (Bailey 2001; Rodríguez 2000). Thus members of these "other race" national-origin groups are likely to lead the way in challenging the U.S. Census and U.S. natives to reconceptualize the current division between race and Hispanic-origin ethnicity. As it stands now, this division exemplifies the idea that Hispanics can be of any race: that Hispanics are neither a singular race nor an aggregation of different races conceptualized along ethno-linguistic or national-origin lines (such as Dominican, Mexican, and Nicaraguan "races"). Salvadorans, Mexicans, Guatemalans, Ecuadorians, Dominicans, Hondurans, Peruvians, Nicaraguans, and Colombians will be the foremost national-origin groups to watch in this respect (although some members of all Latin American-origin groups will certainly be involved).

Most members of other national-origin groups are likely to pose more fundamental challenges to U.S. conceptions of whiteness and blackness. The foremost players here are likely to be the "disproportionately white" immigrant groups from Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Chile, and the "disproportionately black" immigrant groups from Haiti, Guyana, Belize, Panama, Suriname, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Honduras (although, again, some members of all Latin American-origin groups will certainly be involved). In earlier times, for example, the boundaries of American whiteness shifted outward to encompass formerly "nonwhite" groups such as the Irish, Italians, Jews, and Eastern Europeans after the last century's great immigration wave (Alba 1990; Ignatiev 1995, 2005; Jacobson 1998; Lieberson 1980; Roediger 1999; Waters 1990). The boundaries of American blackness have also started to expand in order to encompass some new immigrant groups and their descendants, such as Haitians, West Indians, and Africans (Bryce-Laporte 1972; Stepick 1998; Waters 1999; Woldemikael 1989). New "black" immigrants, from both Spanish and non-Spanish countries of origin, will be key actors in establishing whether (and if so, how) the particular American conception of blackness will come to include all of them and their descendants by virtue of their African heritages or dark phenotypes, and whether (and if so, how) U.S. notions of blackness will be reconstituted in any way by coming to include and encompass members of these groups.

Already in 1990, these diverse self-identifications exhibited in U.S. Census data offer a brief, overarching look into the extraordinary racial and ethnic diversity that new Latinos are bringing with them into the United States (Rumbaut 1992, 1996). These meager data alone that show that the American vision of race—one that has been historically "dominated by dichotomous categories of 'black' and 'white,' which are popularly seen as

representing unbridgeable differences" (Bailey 2001: 679)—is going to be contested and challenged by new as well as existing Latinos and their descendants in the decades to come. And OMB's official definition of Hispanics/Latinos notwithstanding—not to mention the U.S. Census's coding measures that keep officially Hispanic/Latino groups inside and officially non-Hispanic/Latino groups outside the boundaries of Hispanic/Latino-origin ethnicity in order to create a boundary between them that is more solid than the one that truly exists—our very ideas and definitions of Hispanic/Latino origin ethnicity are probably going to change, too.

Second-Generation Dominicans and Brazilians: Case Studies in New Latino Experience

These two groups provide examples of the complex ways in which new Latino groups (1) encounter external identification by U.S. natives as Hispanics/Latinos and (2) employ their own self-identifications and incoming conceptions of race and ethnicity to determine paths of incorporation against the backdrop of prevalent and homogenizing U.S. ethno-racial categories. These two groups also illustrate how new immigrant groups will manage their relationships to Hispanic/Latino identity (as well as to whiteness and blackness) in very different ways—ways that are likely to differ even from those of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans.

I focus on 1.5- and second-generation children of immigrants instead of adult immigrants for several reasons.[7] The importance of both nativity (that is, U.S. versus foreign place of birth) and age has been documented by researchers working with 1.5- and second-generation immigrants in the United States (Bailey 2001; Fernández-Kelly 1998; Martes 2000; Menezes 2002; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Ch. 7; Rumbaut 2005; Sales 2001; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 1995, 2001; Waters 1999). Nativity and age are significant because adolescence is a primary period of social and psychological identity formation (Erickson 1963), and because identity formation occurs in a U.S. context for these children. Latin American children, both immigrant and U.S.-born, have more institutional insertion in American life than their parents do because they attend its schools and may have more contact with children of other racial and ethnic groups. In this way, U.S.-born children of Latin Americans do not harbor the same experience with or knowledge of race and ethnicity in Latin America as do their parents. Therefore, the processes of racial and ethnic identity formation are likely to be different for U.S.-born and younger Latin Americans than for adult immigrants, who experience adolescence in a Latin American context and who, like most immigrants,

identify most strongly by national origin. In sum, the ways in which immigrants are incorporated into U.S. society over the long term hinge largely on second-generation actions and identifications (Bailey 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut 2005; Waters 1999). And so looking to the racial and ethnic identifications of immigrant youth help us understand long-term possibilities for overall immigrant incorporation into the U.S. ethno-racial hierarchy better than looking at adult immigrants alone.[8]

Second-generation Dominicans and Brazilians have several things in common which demonstrate the ways in which new Latino groups will affect our current understandings of race and ethnicity. First, both groups' parents have migrated to the United States from countries with complex ethno-racial histories of their own. Second, the majority of individuals from both groups match dominant U.S. criteria for inclusion in the categories "black" and "white" (Bailey 2001: 679), although in terms of language and cultural heritage, Dominicans match criteria for assignment to the popularly and officially recognized category "Hispanic" (679), while Brazilians do not, by virtue of their Portuguese instead of Spanish "origin or culture."

Many second-generation Dominicans and Brazilians also define their "race" in terms of language and ethno-linguistic heritage, as Dominican and Brazilian (see Table 3). However, these primary identifications get suppressed by official U.S. forms asking for racial and ethnic identifications in terms of the dominant U.S. categories of white, black, Hispanic/Latino, and so forth. On official forms such as these, Dominicans tend to identify as

Table 3. Brazilian Youth's Responses to Questions about Race and Skin Color

Interview Question			
What Is Your Race? [Open-ended Question]		What Is Your Skin Color? [Open-ended Question]	
Brazilian	12 (55%)	White	11 (50%)
White	2 (9%)	Moreno (dark)	6 (27%)
Black[a]	2 (9%)	White (but partly black, moreno, or not really white)	3 (14%)
Moreno/Mixed	2 (9%)		
Hispanic	1 (5%)		
Other	1 (5%)	Morena clara (roughly, lighter mixed)	1 (5%)
Don't know	1 (5%)		
No answer	1 (5%)	Amarela (roughly, yellow)	1 (5%)
Total	22	Total	22

a One of these youth considers himself black in Brazil but Latino in the US since he "is an immigrant."
Source: Author's interviews, Boston 2002; originally published in Marrow (2003).

Table 4. Brazilian Youth's Responses to a Copy of the 2000 Census's Official Race Question

What Is This Person's Race? Mark One or More Races to Indicate What This Person Considers Himself/Herself to Be:	
White	8 (36%)
Other—Brazilian	4 (18%)
White AND Other—Brazilian	2 (9%)
American Indian	2 (9%)
White AND Other—Hispanic	1 (5%)
White AND Other—Latin American	1 (5%)
White AND Other—Brazilian Indian	1 (5%)
White AND Black AND American Indian	1 (5%)

Source: Author's interviews, Boston 2002; originally published in Marrow (2003).

Table 5. Brazilian Youth's Responses to a Copy of the 2000 Census's Official Hispanic/Latino Origin Ethnicity Question

Is This Person Spanish/Hispanic/Latino? Mark the "No" Box if Not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino:	
Not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino	11 (50%)
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino—Brazilian	6 (27%)
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino—Latino	2 (9%)
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino—Brazilian- American	1 (5%)
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino	1 (5%)
Not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino AND Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino—Brazilian	1 (5%)
Total	22 (100%)

Source: Author's interviews, Boston 2002; originally published in Marrow (2003).

"Hispanics/Latinos" (Bailey 2001: 680), while Brazilians tend to identify predominantly as "whites" and "other race" but *not* as Hispanics/Latinos (see Tables 4 and 5; Marrow 2003; Sales 2001), just as their parents do (Martes 2000, this volume; Sales 1999a, 1999b). That many first- and second-generation Dominicans and Brazilians conceptualize their primary racial identity in such fixed national terms (Rumbaut 2005) is not surprising, especially given the similar ways in which other Latin Americans often describe their race as equivalent to their "nationality, culture, familial socialization, birthplace, skin color, ethnicity, or a combination of these" (Montalvo and Codina 2001: 322; Bailey 2001; Rodríguez 2000).

This conceptualization is also not surprising given the ways in which the Dominican Republic and Brazil have treated race historically. In both countries existing correlations between phenotype and class fail (for the most part[9]) to produce a "categorical form of hierarchy" like the one that exists in the United States between African Americans and whites (Bailey

2001: 695). Furthermore, in both countries a fixed national idea of race has been constructed historically so as to exemplify and cover a mixed range of phenotypes *in the context of national unity*. In the Dominican Republic, this takes the form of elevating a largely imagined indigenous Taíno ancestry and a "one-drop" rule in which "perceived or imagined European ancestry makes an individual not black" to the fore, in contradistinction to "black" Haitians (Bailey 2001: 694–8). In Brazil, racial mixing has long been a part of the nation-building project. For example, an official ideology of "whitening" dominated Brazilian racial thought in the first decades of the twentieth century, in which Europeans, Africans, and Indians were mixing and, on the whole, "becoming whiter." This whitening ideology was followed by the rise of racial democracy and its elevation of racial mixing and racial equality in the mid-twentieth century, which considered all Brazilians as part of one and only one "Brazilian" race. Brazil also boasts a similar version of the Latin American "one-drop" rule in which "perceived or imagined European ancestry makes an individual not black." Although both Brazil and the Dominican Republic exhibit a clear hierarchy of desirability, with whiteness ranking much higher along the socioeconomic and cultural hierarchy than blackness, these similar histories of nation-building and racial formation stand in stark contrast to the United States' polarized vision of whiteness/blackness, its history of racial exclusion in nation-building processes, and its opposite "one-drop" rule in which perceived or imagined African ancestry makes an individual not white (Bailey 2001; Davis 1991; Degler 1986; Harris 1964; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000; Skidmore 1993; Telles 2004; Wacquant 1997; Wagley 1965; Winant 1992). Therefore, second-generation Dominicans and Brazilians give us an intriguing lens through which to view "the transformative effects that post-1965 immigrants and their descendants are having on United States ethno-racial categories" (Bailey 2001: 677).

On the one hand, Bailey demonstrates that second-generation Dominicans in Providence, Rhode Island empathize and identify more positively with African Americans than their immigrant parents do (2001: 701). These children, who grow up in between the Dominican racial framework handed down to them by their parents and the dominant U.S. racial framework all around them, are "more ready than their parents to acknowledge their African ancestry" (702). On the other hand, despite these closer structural identifications with African Americans, second-generation Dominicans "identify their race categorically as Dominican, Spanish, or Hispanic despite the dominance in America of a phenotype-linked racialization system," much as mainland Puerto Ricans do (691):

> Most members of the first generation see themselves as having little in common with African Americans. They do not think of themselves as black or of African descent, and discrimination based on lack of English or immigration status are much more salient to most than discrimination based on phenotype. Life in America for many is a sojourn in a land of economic opportunity that consists of work, family, and little beyond the immigrant community. . . . The second generation, in contrast, grows up as nonwhites in a society in which whites are at the top of the economic and ethnic/racial hierarchies. . . . Exclusion and discrimination by white Americans thus lead many in the second generation to see their identities relative to black and white Americans in very different terms than their parents, even as the second generation maintains an ethnolinguistic, rather than black/white, understanding of their own identities (704).

In this way, second-generation Dominicans *remain* or *become* Hispanics/Latinos—depending on whether or not we consider incoming Dominican immigrants to be Hispanics/Latinos as well—differentiating themselves from both U.S. whites and blacks and thinking of their Dominican/Hispanic/Spanish identity as a race, ethnicity, and culture all in one.

Bailey attributes second-generation Dominicans' ethno-linguistically based racial identifications to three interrelated factors that enable them to resist American black racialization:

1. Dominican-Americans as a group do not fit into a single United States phenotype-based racial category;
2. Dominicans on the island have traditionally seen themselves as a Spanish and more or less white population, and certainly not as African or black. This framework for self-identification as not black is passed on to the second generation in America;
3. Speaking Spanish sets Dominican-Americans apart from most native-born black and white Americans, qualifies them for membership in the widely recognized category "Hispanic" and contributes to the maintenance and vigor of an ethno-linguistic community which in turn reinforces and validates traditional Dominican ways of thinking about social identities (2001: 691).

In order to make the comparison between second-generation Dominicans and Brazilians, I want to focus on Bailey's third factor—that *speaking Spanish* both qualifies Dominican Americans for membership in a widely

recognized "Hispanic" category (a category that is widely recognized and ratified not just by Dominican immigrants and their children but also by U.S. natives) and promotes Dominican youth's abilities to maintain traditional Dominican ways of thinking about social identities.

Bailey argues that "Following immigration, the Spanish language of Dominican-Americans and their parents sets them apart from black and white Americans in ways that the languages of many other African descent populations do not" (692). Because of the fundamental role that Spanish language plays in this process, I further maintain that second-generation Brazilians, whose parents speak Portuguese, have experiences that are more similar to children of non-Spanish immigrant groups (such as Haitians and Belizeans) than to children of other immigrant groups from Spanish Latin America:

> For Haitian second generation, Haitian creole, and to a lesser extent French, contribute to the constitution of a distinct identity, but this ethno-linguistic identity does not have the support of the massive community that Spanish does. While there are Haitian ethnic enclaves in New York and Miami, for example, their ethno-linguistic communities are dwarfed by the Spanish-speaking and identified one, and there is no ethno-linguistic category such as "Hispanic" to which to assign francophone/creole-speaking immigrants from the former French colonies. While a few Haitians from the educated elite may define themselves as "French," few Americans will ratify them in that identity (Bailey 2001: 692).

Like French and Haitian Creole, Brazilian and Portuguese language and identifiers are not readily acknowledged or ratified by U.S. natives in the way that Hispanic/Latino and Spanish ones are. In line with what Bailey describes among Haitians, the lack of public recognition for these languages and identifiers in the United States is likely to speed up black-white racialization of Brazilians and their children relative to Spanish-speaking immigrant groups, just as it does for Haitians, West Indians, Belizeans, and a host of other non-Spanish-speaking immigrant groups. Over time (and depending on their individual phenotypes, of course), I maintain that members of these groups are likely to be perceived more as "whites who speak Portuguese" or "blacks who speak Portuguese" than as "Brazilians" or "Portuguese" in full (Bailey 2001: 693).

Bailey also argues that "the presence of a vibrant and visible Hispanic community is a key to the second generation's maintenance of Dominican

frameworks for racial categorization—i.e., that Dominicans constitute a race and that they are not black—in the face of dominant American phenotype-symbolized racialization practices" (693). In contrast, a practical assessment of both the demographic data and Americans' awareness of Brazilians in the United States should make us cautious about the long-term viability of Brazilians' efforts to maintain Brazilian frameworks for racial categorization in the face of U.S.-style racialization processes. As of 2004, the largest numerical estimates of Brazilians in the United States ranged from 800,000 to 1.2 million (DeBiaggi 2002; Fleischer 2000; Margolis 1995; Martes 2000). While this figure may seem high to Brazil, historically a country of immigrants and not emigrants (see DeBiaggi 2002; Skidmore 1993) or to Brazilian immigrants themselves, it is dwarfed by a Hispanic population of 42 million (as of the 2005 American Community Survey) and, more importantly, by Americans' overwhelming ignorance of Brazilian identity. Not only do Brazilians compose a very small proportion of total U.S. immigrants,[10] but Portuguese is a relatively inaudible language in the United States (especially compared to Spanish); Brazilians reside in cities where Hispanic groups are also disproportionately concentrated;[11] and Americans are largely if not completely unfamiliar with both Brazil and Brazilian immigrants, at the same time that they are learning more Spanish and witnessing a Spanish-centered "Latinization" of the United States. Hence it is likely that Brazilians will have to work very hard to prevent their current identity from giving way to ones more oriented around the *ancestry-based black-white schema of race* or around the *Spanish/Hispanic-centered idea of Latinos* in the United States (barring significant future developments in these two concepts, of course). However unfortunate, it will likely be difficult for Brazilians to resist such pressures, judging by the evidence we have for other non-Hispanic groups. Brazilian identity is likely to remain a central feature of immigrants' own self-conceptions and ideas of community, but the sheer power of dominant American racial categories is likely to speed up the racialization process among Brazilians in the United States, especially via external categorization.

In my interviews with 1.5- and second-generation Brazilian youth, I find support for this racialization thesis. However, I also find that it operates *not only* through external categorization of Brazilians by U.S. natives (which does indeed work to erode their Brazilian identity), but also through their own self-identifications as "whites" and "blacks" rather than as Hispanics/Latinos (which helps to speed up U.S. racialization along a black-white scale when their Brazilian identities are not ratified by U.S. natives). In other words, Brazilian immigrants bring with them a black-white scale of skin color identification that dovetails with the black-white scale in the United States (see Tables 3 and 4), even though the two systems clash over the particulars of who is white and who is black. Brazilians' racial identifications are somewhat more easily translated into American racial identifications in terms of black and white rather than as Brazilian, which is partly reconciled among Brazilian immigrants because black and white carried meanings for them before migration as well. Bailey's second-generation Dominicans, in contrast, shy away from such black-white identifications in the United States, maintaining an ethno-linguistic identification that situates all Dominican Americans in between the two, and which is ratified precisely because of the dominant U.S. association between Dominican and Hispanic/Spanish.[12] Therefore, while Dominicans *stay* or *become* U.S. Latinos by the second generation, Brazilians *unbecome* U.S. Latinos by the second generation—becoming mostly white (and sometimes black) "Americans" instead (Marrow 2003, 2004; Martes 2000, this volume).

What would explain second-generation Brazilians trend of *unbecoming* U.S. Latinos if Brazilian immigrants are not officially considered U.S. Latinos in the first place? For Brazilians, official exclusion (and therefore also protection) from U.S. Hispanic/Latino pan-ethnicity works in conjunction with Brazilian immigrants' self-identifications as non-Hispanics/Latinos (see Martes, this volume; Ribeiro 1999; Sales 1999a, 1999b) and U.S. natives' ratifications of those self-identifications to produce a linear rather than reactive path of ethnic incorporation into U.S. society (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).[13] In other words, the official U.S. logic that defines Brazilians *outside* the boundaries of Hispanic/Latino pan-ethnicity meets the various rationalizations that individual Brazilians employ to differentiate themselves from Hispanics (and Latinos, where Latino equals Hispanic). When these logics are then ratified from the outside by U.S. natives- which they largely are, after some negotiation—Brazilians move along their desired course to become full-fledged Americans or Brazilian Americans instead of pan-ethnic Hispanics/Latinos.[14]

To illustrate, several researchers and I have now described how the official logic of Brazilians as non-Hispanics/Latinos and the self-identification logics of Brazilians as non-Hispanics (and sometimes non-Latinos) often come into real conflict with the way that many U.S. natives view foreign-born Brazilian immigrants as Hispanics/Latinos. In other words, adult first-generation Brazilian immigrants may claim not to be Hispanics/Latinos in the United States, for whatever reasons, but the sheer force of what I term the (1) *linguistic*, (2) *geographic*, and (3) *racial logics of Hispanic/Latino identification in the United States* may keep those claims

from ever being ratified by U.S. natives. For example, if a first-generation immigrant speaks English with an accent, he or she may continue to be identified as Hispanic/Latino in the United States by the linguistic logic, regardless of his or her self-identification. This may also happen if a first-generation immigrant was born outside the United States (by the geographic logic) or exhibits "mixed," "mestizo," "brown," or "multiracial" physical features that most U.S. natives continue to associate with Hispanics/Latinos today by the racial logic (Marrow 2003).

By the second generation, however, Brazilians have become "American" in three principal ways. First, they identify themselves somewhere between Brazilians and Americans rather than as Hispanics/Latinos (see Table 6; Marrow 2003, 2004; Martes 2000, 2003; Menezes 2002; Sales 2001). Second, they identify more as just white and just black than do their immigrant counterparts, and they view both of these as markers of true American identity (see Marrow 2003). For example, in 1990 U.S. Census data, U.S.-born Brazilians self-identified significantly more as just white (85.7% vs. 82.7%) or just black (3.9% vs. 1.7%) and significantly less as some other race (8.9% vs. 13.7%) than did their immigrant counterparts. These trends hold in the 2000 Census, where U.S.-born Brazilians self-identified more as just white (77.1% vs. 69.7%), somewhat more as just black (2.4% vs. 1.9%), and less as some other race (10.3% vs. 15.4%) than did their immigrant counterparts (Marrow 2004). This signals an important generational difference within Brazilians' racial identifications, with U.S.-born children of Brazilians self-identifying more in line with the powerful black-white binary that has long dominated race relations and the racial hierarchy in the United States than do their immigrant counterparts. Moreover, looking at Brazilians' responses as "other Hispanics" in the 1990 Hispanic-origin

Table 6. Brazilian Youth's Hispanic/Latin American/ Latino Identifications

	Response				
Interview Question	Yes	No	Didn't answer/ didn't know	Maybe, it depends	Total
Do you consider yourself Hispanic?	2 (9%)	19 (86%)	1 (5%)	—	22 (100%)
Do you consider yourself Latin American?	17 (77%)	5 (23%)	—	—	22 (100%)
Do you consider yourself Latino/a?	12 (55%)	9 (41%)	1 (5%)	—	22 (100%)
Do other Latin Americans, Spanish-speakers, include you when they use the term Latino?	9 (41%)	9 (41%)	2 (9%)	2 (9%)	22 (100%)

Source: Author's interviews, Boston 2002; originally published in Marrow (2003).

ethnicity question before census officials "cleaned" them signals another important generational difference: Brazilians' Hispanic-origin ethnicity identifications are more of an immigrant than a long-term phenomenon. Despite somewhat higher percentages of U.S.-born Brazilians' identifying as Mexican/Mexican American/Chicanos and Puerto Ricans relative to their immigrant counterparts, a significantly higher percentage of U.S.-born Brazilians identify as "non-Hispanics" than do their immigrant counterparts (71.9% vs. 68.4%) (Marrow 2003: 437–9).

Here, it is important to emphasize that by virtue of overcoming at least two of the three logics of Hispanic/Latino identification in the United States—the *linguistic logic* by speaking English more fluently than their parents, and the *geographic logic* by having spent more time or being born in the United States[15]—second-generation Brazilians stand a much better chance of being recognized as non-Hispanics/Latinos than do their adult Brazilian immigrant parents. Because the racial logic of Hispanic/Latino external identification plays a strong (if not the most important) role in this process,[16] this is especially the case for Brazilian youth like Silvana and Rayane who boast very light skin colors and European ancestral heritages (Italian, German, Portuguese, and Spanish were among those some of my interviewees listed) and who see their whiteness ratified by U.S. natives who also believe that they are white:

Interviewer: What do Americans think you are? Do they think you are white, Hispanic, Latino, Portuguese, Brazilian, South American, etc.?
Respondent: I think white.
Interviewer: Can you give me an example of this?
Respondent: I think because of my color. (Silvana, 14)

Respondent: People think that I'm American. I'm really white. (Rayane, 12)

Appearance also contributes to the identification of Brazilian youth like Maria Luisa, who boast very dark skin colors and African ancestral heritages and who see their blackness ratified by U.S. natives who also believe that they are black:

Respondent: I'm Brazilian and black. And you know, a lot of people, if they look at me, will not think I am actually Latina, I tell you that. (Maria Luisa, U.S.-born, 11)

It is more complicated for Brazilian youngsters like Paula, whose skin colors fall between these very white and black skin tones, and who are therefore more consistently categorized as Hispanics/Latinos by U.S. natives despite their self-identifications to the contrary:

> Interviewer: What do other people here think you are, in terms of your race or ethnicity?
>
> Respondent: Most of the time, people ask us if we're Hispanic, and they come up and say, "Oh, you're Hispanic—what country are you from?" And because of appearance too, they think we are Hispanic. The majority of Brazilians look like Latinos (*parece com latino*). (Paula, 13)

But by continuing to differentiate themselves from Hispanics/Latinos on linguistic and geographic grounds, and by having their identifications as non-Hispanics/Latinos eventually ratified by these logics, mixed-looking Brazilians like Paula begin to forcefully challenge exclusive American views of whiteness—since most Brazilians, as we saw earlier, self-identify as whites based on a more expansive notion of the term in Brazil, and since U.S.-bound Brazilian migrants are disproportionately more upper-middle class than the Brazilian population on a whole (Margolis 1994). U.S. natives must also reconsider Brazilians' claims to blackness in a few cases where Brazilians identify as blacks, but the force of the U.S. "one-drop" rule makes this easier than reconsidering other Brazilians' claims to whiteness (Marrow 2003).

The third way that second-generation Brazilians have become more American is that they use Latino as an identifier that might include and encompass Brazilians in a collective sense only insofar as Latino is connected to being foreign and does not extend into later generations. Both Junior and Maria Luisa do this when they distinguish themselves from immigrant Latinos:

> Interviewer: Do you think there is a difference between the words Latino and Latin American?
>
> Respondent: Latino is one thing, while Latin American is another culture—it's Latino but a little more American. (Junior, 12)
>
> Interviewer: Do you think there is a difference between the words Latino and Latin American?
>
> Respondent: Yes. Because Latin American is almost American. They get the greencard or whatever. The Latino is just Latino.
>
> Interviewer: And what does Latino mean to you?
>
> Respondent: For me? Different culture, different people. (Maria Luisa, U.S.-born, 11)

On the one hand, these two respondents illustrate how second-generation Brazilian youngsters, are adamant on agreeing that they "do not become Latinos" but rather that they become "Americans" over time. While this is partially because they interpret Latino as an identifier which does not include them in the United States, referring only to persons of Spanish language, origin, or culture instead, it is also partially because they interpret Latino as an identifier which describes a foreign status rather than an American one—a status shared by some of their parents perhaps, but more so by Brazilians and other Latin Americans abroad.

On the other hand, these two respondents illustrate how, along the way to achieving full American status, Brazilian youth tend to identify more consistently as Latin Americans rather than as Hispanics or Latinos (see also Table 7; Martes 2000, this volume). Interestingly, only one of my respondents justified her sense of being Latin American on the grounds that Brazil is part of the Americas and, like other countries in the West-

Table 7. Length of Time and U.S. Nativity on Brazilian Youth's Ethnic Identifications

Interview Question			
Would you say that your time spent living here in the United States has made you feel more or less Latino?		What do [you or any Brazilians that you know who were born here in the United States] refer to themselves as? [Open-ended Question]	
More	7 (32%)	Brazilian	4 (18%)
Less[a]	1 (5%)	American	5 (23%)
Nothing Different or Never Felt Latino	9 (41%)	Brazilian-American	11 (50%)
Some of Both	1 (5%)	Didn't answer	2 (9%)
Didn't answer	4 (18%)		
Total	22	Total	22

a This is a U.S.-born Brazilian who says she is less Latino than Brazilian immigrants, because she identifies as "Latin American" and sees "Latinos" as foreign.

Source: Author's interviews, Boston 2002; originally published in Marrow (2003).

ern hemisphere, bears as much claim to being American as the United States. Rather, the large majority of respondents agree in their characterization of American as pertaining to the United States. For these children, speaking English, having spent time in the United States, having participated in U.S. customs, and most importantly, being a U.S. citizen are markers of American identity. They justify their sense of being Latin American by having migrated to the United States and becoming American; they report feeling more American than their parents; and the two U.S.-born respondents report feeling less Latino than their immigrant counterparts by virtue of being more American than they. In sum, second-generation Brazilian youth believe that they *gain rather than lose* the American part of their identities by migration, and this stands in contrast to the typical U.S. vision that incoming Latin American immigrants become U.S. Hispanics/Latinos, sacrificing the American part of their identifier along the way.

In this way, second-generation Brazilians' interpretations of Hispanic/Latino identity differ from many existing Latino populations' conception of the term. For them Latino is something foreign that is lost over time and generations in the United States, whereas in the U.S. experience and literature, Hispanic/Latino identity has traditionally been viewed as a made-in-the-U.S.A. identifier that can speak directly to the experiences of Latin American- or Spanish-origin minority groups *within the United States*. Yet second-generation Brazilians' interpretations of Hispanic/Latino identity also differ from the interpretations of Hispanic/Latino identity that Bailey's (2001) second-generation new Latino Dominicans espouse. For them, it seems that Hispanic and Latino are terms which can describe and ratify Dominican identity, bridging and supporting that identity between the Dominican Republic and the United States and therefore becoming more of a marker of both foreign Dominican and native American national, linguistic, ethnic, and racial statuses all in one. Finally, both of these interpretations of Hispanic/Latino identity differ from that which OMB officials had in mind in 1977, when the term Hispanic was first used to speak only about *native-born* Mexicans Americans and Puerto Ricans in the United States.

Discussion and Suggestions for Further Research

This overview and comparison of second-generation Dominicans and Brazilians brings to light several interesting points. First, there is no static or set definition of who Hispanics/Latinos are, despite the official definition of the group used by the U.S. Census as well as other (usually less formal but no less important) definitions used elsewhere. Some members of officially Hispanic immigrant groups did not identify as Hispanics on the 1990 U.S. Census, which means they probably do not identify as Hispanics outside the census either. In contrast, some members of officially non-Hispanic immigrant groups did, and they include not only Brazilians and Belizeans but also other groups that U.S. natives do not usually associate anywhere near the boundaries of Hispanic/Latino identity, such as Filipinos and Angolans. This does not mean that these individuals consider themselves to be Hispanics/Latinos in the same ways that other self-identified Hispanic/Latinos do. It simply means they are conceptualizing some sort of relationship to these terms and the groups to which they officially refer, and these relationships demonstrate just how complex Hispanic/Latino identity is in the United States today.

Second, incoming conceptions of race will operate differently for different Latin American-origin groups[17]—providing fuel for the assertive, voluntary, or internal identifications these immigrants and their children will make *from the inside*, and the ways in which these self-identifications will come into contact with the assigned, involuntary, or external identifications *from the outside* in the United States (Cornell and Hartmann 1997). As a result, the conceptions of race and ethnicity that new immigrants hold and pass onto their children will not be the only ones modified over time. American conceptions of whiteness, blackness, and Hispanic/Latino identity (as well as other racialized concepts I have not focused on in this essay, such as Asian American and Native American identity) will probably change, too.

Third, the Dominican and Brazilian cases expose the workings of Hispanic/Latino categorization by suggesting that incorporation into a minoritized Hispanic/Latino group depends more on what immigrants are perceived to look like by U.S. natives in *racial* terms, rather than on linguistic or nativity differences that fade over time. By the second generation, when Dominicans' and Brazilians' ties to being born in Latin America and speaking a foreign language have diminished, the *racial logic* of external categorization remains as the principal axis determining where U.S. natives see them. For example, the Dominican and Brazilian cases show that very light-skinned or very dark-skinned children of Latin American immigrants are likely to be perceived more as white or black and less as Hispanic/Latino as English replaces foreign languages and U.S. citizenship replaces immigrant status, unless they continue to look Hispanic/Latino, mestizo, brown, multiracial, and other such classifications (Marrow 2003: 453–4).

If these children want to maintain an Hispanic/Latino identity—as Bailey (2001) shows that second-generation Dominicans do but other researchers and I have shown that second-generation Brazilians do not—they will have to exert more effort in displaying signals of that Hispanic/Latino identity, such as using Spanish and/or making visible and audible references to Hispanic/Latino cultures. Bailey (2001) illustrates how second-generation Dominicans do engage in such signaling, so that they will continue to be perceived as according to their ethno-linguistic perception of race (Dominican/Spanish/Hispanic) rather than as blacks. To the contrary, the Brazilian youth in my research view whiteness and blackness as more American than Hispanic/Latino, and so they gladly let go of any claims they or their parents may have had to being Hispanics/Latinos. However, both cases illustrate that becoming Hispanic/Latino is not necessarily a foregone conclusion for all immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries, nor is it necessarily an impossibility for those coming from elsewhere. Dominican youth have other options for self-identification. They could attempt to define themselves as Dominicans in contradistinction to other Hispanic/Spanish groups, like Brazilian youth currently do, or they could attempt to change the current U.S. categorization of Dominican to fall more in line with black, multiracial, or other identifiers rather than with Spanish/Hispanic/Latino. Likewise, Brazilian youth still have the option to identify as Hispanics/Latinos in the future if they so desire, even though they do not seem to want to today.[18]

Other new Latino groups will have some say in their ethno-racial identifications, too. To be sure, the official definition of Hispanic/Latino ethnicity used by the U.S. Census today (which informs American public opinion of who Hispanics/Latinos are to a strong degree) buffers Brazilians and several other national-origin groups from inclusion within the Hispanic/Latino category, at the same time that it includes other new Latino groups such as Argentines, Venezuelans, Costa Ricans, and Hondurans. In this way, these latter groups are increasingly institutionalized into official and public conceptions of who Hispanics/Latinos are (for just a few out of many examples, see Logan 2001, 2002; Suro 2002; Suro and Singer 2002). Consequently, if members of these groups want to resist incorporation as Hispanics/Latinos, they may have to work harder at it than most Brazilians currently do. In other words, a Chilean or Venezuelan of Italian or German descent may have to work harder than a Brazilian with the same ancestral heritage in order to prove her non-Hispanic/Latino identity, simply by virtue of speaking Spanish instead of Portuguese or hailing from a Spanish- instead of Portuguese-speaking country (see, for example, Salazar 2002). A Spaniard may have to do the same, although Spaniards get different treatment because of the U.S. association between European and white (Hollinger 1995). Even a third-generation Mexican American with white skin color, blue eyes, and fluent English language ability may have to work hard to disassociate himself from Hispanic/Latino identity if U.S. natives know his Mexican ancestry, as they are quick to associate Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban roots with being Hispanic/Latino today (see Chávez 1991 on the difficulties of moving out of a minoritized Hispanic/Latino grouping). However, Hispanic/Latino identity seems fuzzy enough at present such that if members of these groups want to identify themselves elsewhere, they probably can. Already López and Stanton-Salazar illustrate how very light-skinned Mexicans Americans are perceived by U.S. natives as whites and treated more favorably for that reason, but with the consequence of being told they do not "look Mexican" (2001: 71). U.S.-born children of Chilean, Venezuelan, Panamanian, or Spanish immigrants are likely to have an even easier time convincing U.S. natives that they are whites or blacks rather than Hispanic/Latinos if they so desire, especially if they look white or look black.

Fourth, in both cases we see new immigrants and their children positioning their own identities so as to further their socioeconomic and cultural interests. Dominican immigrants self-identify as Dominican in order to position themselves above Haitian blacks. Their children self-identify as Dominican/Hispanic/Spanish so as to differentiate themselves from both U.S. whites and blacks, even though they are more willing to recognize their own African heritage and empathize more closely with the structural position of African Americans in the United States (Bailey 2001). On the other hand, Brazilians' successful incorporation as Americans depends on their own racialized disassociations from Hispanics/Latinos. Both groups are becoming incorporated into the U.S. social structure by virtue of powerful social inequalities and hierarchies that work to the disadvantage of other groups. These groups are primarily African Americans in the Dominican case (although Dominican and Puerto Rican youth's relationships to African Americans, especially in their attachments to hip hop culture, beg more of our attention). For Brazilians these groups are primarily Hispanics/Latinos, whom many Brazilians disparage and identify in racialized terms, "buying into" the U.S. ethno-racial hierarchy in order to move upward. For example, like some other respondents, Cristina utilizes a racial logic to differentiate herself from Hispanics/Latinos, viewing the nature and content of Brazilians' racial mixture as different from and therefore better than that of Hispanics/Latinos:

Interviewer: In Brazil, did you ever imagine Brazil a part of an entire Latin America, with the other Latin American countries?

Respondent: No. We are the only country in Latin America that speaks Portuguese . . . and that has a different culture from Argentina, from Chile, from Mexico. From Argentina to Mexico, taking out Brazil, the culture is practically the same, the habits are practically equal, but in Brazil no, it's different. Because, I don't know if you understand me . . . if you take an Argentine, a Cuban, a Mexican, and I don't know . . . a Venezuelan, you wouldn't know which one was born in which country, you see? It's all the same, there's no difference. But in Brazil, no.

Interviewer: Do you consider yourself Latino?

Respondent: No. Because Hispanic is someone who speaks Spanish and Latino. . . . I don't speak Spanish to be that either. And I'm not *morena* . . . so there is no reason for me to mark myself as that. I don't think I'm Latino because I don't have Indian blood and I don't have black blood to be considered Latino. (Cristina, 17)

Obviously, some of these comments and differentiations are demeaning. But they confirm that frequently "ethnic loyalties reflect, and are maintained by, the underlying socioeconomic interests of group members" (Patterson 1975: 305).

Fifth, human capital, class, and phenotypic characteristics of new immigrants bear heavily on the ways in which they are able to command external ratification of their self-identifications. For example, the U.S. Dominican and Brazilian populations differ in average socioeconomic status. Brazilians rank among the better educated, more professional, and more geographically dispersed immigrant groups coming from Latin America, while Dominicans rank among the less educated, more blue-collar, and more geographically concentrated ones (Logan 2002; Marrow 2007; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Rumbaut 1996). These socioeconomic characteristics combine with their individual- and group-level phenotypes (thus more Brazilians than Dominicans in the United States are likely to self-identify as white, to be perceived as white, and to intermarry with white U.S. natives) and their varying incoming conceptions of race to

affect how new Latin American immigrants and their children are assigned to certain places in the U.S. ethno-racial hierarchy, as well as how they see and manage their own trajectories for upward mobility in terms of comparisons with and differentiations from other groups. And local U.S. context of reception further affects these processes.[19] For example, Martes (this volume) shows how Brazilians' process of *unbecoming* U.S. Latinos is taking on a slightly different shape in Miami than in Boston, at least for some Brazilians, given differing local contexts and immigrant population characteristics in these two cities.[20] Hispanics, in particular Cubans, wield much more power in Miami than they do in Boston (Osterman 1993), which makes Hispanic/Latino a more positive identity there. In Newark, New Jersey, by contrast, African Americans not only comprise a higher percentage of the population but also dominate the political elite. Ramos-Zayas (2005) finds that this makes African American a more positive identity there, and consequently, second-generation Brazilians in Newark value black culture as "better" (in the sense of "more hip") than a relatively nondominant white culture there, which they perceive to be largely "cultureless." Even in my own research, Brazilian youth attending schools in central-city Boston were more likely than Brazilian schoolchildren in the suburbs to be surrounded by a greater number of Hispanic classmates, to view Hispanics as more powerful than blacks, and to see Hispanics as the ethnic group with whom Brazilians have the most in common (Marrow 2003: 459–60).

Finally, the Dominican and Brazilian cases highlight our need to pay more attention to the ways in which Latin American immigrants' incoming conceptions of class and race may affect and ultimately transform U.S. ones. It is well known that Latin American countries have historically placed more emphasis on class distinctions as markers of social status than they have on categorical racial divisions. Today, the United States is witnessing rapid increases in economic inequality that are changing the ways U.S. natives think of themselves and their surrounding social and racial hierarchies. In addition, the 2000 U.S. Census made an unprecedented move toward recognizing multiraciality for the first time in U.S. history (Nobles 2000; Perlmann 2000; Perlmann and Waters 2000). While the U.S. multiracial movement was based primarily on concerns about how to support and deal with multiracial children born to black and white parents (Williams 2006), it remains to be seen how Latin American immigrants and their children will contribute to the data and debate. None of the Brazilian young people that I interviewed ever truly challenged the existence of categories or groups such as "whites," "blacks," and "Hispanics/

Latinos" (except to qualify and redraw the boundaries around each group). But there is still reason to think that new Latinos and their children will contribute to a growing U.S. emphasis on class distinctions as more fundamental markers of social status, and on multiraciality as an official and unofficial reality in this country that can take varying form and shape. Changes in U.S. emphases on class and race will, in turn, affect the ways in which U.S. natives view and externally categorize incoming immigrants and their children in the first place.

In this regard, there are no definitive predictions and no lines carved in stone for what will become of U.S. conceptions of race and Hispanic/Latino-origin ethnicity in the years to come, and where the "other" or "new" Latinos will end up within them. Some people have already called for eliminating the Hispanic/Latino category entirely, given that trying to define and conceptualize it has become so complicated as to be rendered useless, while others have suggested it may disappear on its own. Regardless of how long it stays around, people will continue to categorize and label each other in the United States, and it is likely that very dark-skinned Latin Americans and their descendants who look a certain way will confront some type of racialized categorization no matter what labels or terms we use to describe it. All that is certain is that the "other" or "new" Latinos and their children will be intimately involved in future transformations of race and Hispanic/Latino origin ethnicity in the United States, whatever they may be, and that their understandings of what Hispanic/Latino identity means will be important.

Notes

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1 The hypodescent rule assumes and demands affiliation with the subordinate rather than the superordinate group. Its "one-drop-of-blood" corollary, which has dominated U.S. racial thought since 1930, has definitively categorized anyone in the United States with any black African heritage at all as "black," and therefore, "subordinate" (Nobles 2000: 135).

2 I utilize 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) census data for this analysis because, unlike 2000 sample census data, they still contain the original codes for respondents' detailed write-in responses to the Hispanic origin ethnicity question in that year.

3 I present information on second-generation Dominicans based solely on Bailey's (2001) research. All findings are directly attributable to this article and the sources cited within it, rather than to research of my own. I use the second-generation Dominican case strictly for comparison with the second-generation Brazilian case, which is based on my own and others' research.

4 Research for this project was conducted through personal contacts at schools and after-school programs in five areas of high Brazilian concentration in the Boston area (Somerville, Cambridge, East Boston, Roxbury, and Dorchester). In line with the recentness of Brazilian immigration, 19 respondents were 1.5-generation immigrants (all living in the United States between 1 and 4 years, with two living here much longer). Two respondents were born in the United States, and another was an immigrant parent of one youth respondent who also wanted to be interviewed. Wherever possible, I also include relevant informal comments from conversations with Brazilians in the Boston area. All names of respondents have been changed.

5 Of particular interest here is that immigrants from Portuguese-speaking countries and Filipinos, who come from a former Spanish colony, identified more strongly as Hispanics than did their counterparts from French- or Italian-speaking countries. Also of interest is that immigrants from Belize and Brazil (as countries comprising part of continental Central and South America, respectively) and Haiti (which shares an island with the Dominican Republic) identified more strongly as Hispanics than did their counterparts from elsewhere in the English-, Dutch-, Portuguese-, and French-speaking Caribbean. Indeed, in the United States context, Hispanic-origin ethnicity often assumes a *linguistic* boundary whereas French and Italian ethnicities enjoy independence and popularity in and of themselves, while Portuguese is not only less known and recognized but also more closely associated with Spanish. Similarly, in the United States context, Hispanic-origin ethnicity often assumes a *geographic* boundary wherein countries which comprise the English-, Dutch-, Portuguese-, and French-speaking Caribbean are not frequently considered sources of U.S.-bound "Hispanic" immigrants, while countries within continental Latin America and countries forming the Spanish-speaking Caribbean are.

6 To explain, 1990 census officials changed (or "cleaned," in official terminology) some Hispanic-origin responses. They coded answers to the 1990 Hispanic-origin ethnicity question differently depending on, first, whether a respondent included a detailed write-in response in his or her answer (like Latino or Dominican), and second, whether a respondent filled out a short-form or long-form census questionnaire. Specifically, 1990 census officials *did not* review any write-in responses on the short-form questionnaire (95% of all questionnaires), leaving all "other Hispanic" responses on those forms as they were; this suggests that most of these responses were indeed captured as "other Hispanics" in overall census data. But census officials *did* review write-in responses on the long-form questionnaire (5% of all questionnaires), changing all "other Hispanic" responses accompanied by a detailed

write-in response that they considered to be non-Hispanic to say "not Hispanic" instead. Therefore, where a respondent marked "other Hispanic" and wrote in a detailed response after it that the U.S. census does not consider to be Hispanic (such as Brazilian or Filipino), he or she was automatically categorized as "other Hispanic" on the short-form questionnaire, but census officials edited this response to "not Hispanic" on the long-form questionnaire. My PUMS sample data only capture responses from the long-form questionnaire (where these "conflicts" were "cleaned"). But original codes remain so that I am able to treat all "cleaned" responses both ways—as "not Hispanic" as well as "other Hispanic" (Marrow 2003: 437).

7 Although there are different definitions of cohort and generation throughout the social science literature, first generation commonly refers to immigrants who enter the United States after the age of 12, the "1.5 generation" commonly refers to immigrants who enter the United States after the ages of 5 or 6, and the second generation commonly refers to U.S.-born children of at least one foreign-born parent.

8 Looking at the identifications of later-generation Brazilians will be even better, although the recentness of Brazilian immigration on a whole makes doing this time-dependent.

9 I would qualify this statement pending on the Afro-Brazilian movement's ability to foster an increasing categorical sense of Afro-Brazilianness, distinct from other "nonblack" Brazilians (see Nobles 2000, Ch. 3; Wacquant 1997; Winant 1992). But as Nobles (2000) notes, for many Brazilians racial democracy and equality still capture the heart of the national sentiment despite existing inequalities by color or race.

10 Brazilians comprised just 0.7% of the total U.S. immigrant population in the 2000 U.S. Census. And while the U.S. census certainly undercounts Brazilians, it undercounts other immigrant groups, too (Anderson and Fienberg 1999).

11 Among others, these include Miami, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and even Atlanta and New Orleans, two "new immigrant destinations" now witnessing dramatic growth in their Spanish-speaking populations.

12 Martes (this volume) and Resende (2002) describe the ways in which Brazilian immigrant community leaders have encouraged Brazilian immigrants to maintain their pre-migration ethno-racial identities by marking "other—Brazilian" on any form that asks for racial or ethnic identification. In this way, Brazilian immigrants explicitly try to resist external U.S. categorizations that homogenize them as whites, blacks, or Hispanics/Latinos, without adequately recognizing their primary Brazilian identities. The comparison with Dominicans is instructive because Dominicans' attempts to elevate Dominican over white or black racial identity are ratified by U.S. natives *because being Dominican is associated with being Hispanic/Latino*, while Brazilians' attempts to elevate Brazilian over white, black, or Hispanic/Latino racial identity are not ratified by U.S. natives in the same way.

13 In general, "reactive ethnicity" refers to a resurgence of ethnic identification that occurs in response to discriminatory attacks on one's identity (for example, in the case of Mexican Americans during the mid-1990s), whereas "linear ethnicity" involves a gradual reduction of ethnic identification in the absence of discriminatory treatment.

14 Rumbaut (2005) differentiates between four identities exhibited by second-generation youth in the United States: full American identities, full national identities (referring to the ancestral homeland or parents' country of birth, in this case Brazilian), hyphenated or dual identities (Brazilian-American), and pan-ethnic identities (Hispanic/Latino and black/African American). See also Portes and Rumbaut (2001).

15 The linguistic and geographic logics of Hispanic/Latino identification become less powerful over both time and generation. Some first-generation immigrants learn English or utilize their native tongues less frequently the more time they spend in the United States; they also spend more time in the United States, acquiring more experience and sometimes a heightened sense of American identity (many eventually attain full U.S. citizenship). Therefore, over time U.S. natives may become, in some cases, less able to identify them externally as Hispanics/Latinos according to the linguistic and geographic logics. Furthermore, in the second generation, children of immigrants speak English and have often lost fluent command of their parents' native tongues (Portes and Hao 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Ch. 6; Portes and Schauffler 1996; Rumbaut 2005), thereby overcoming the linguistic logic of Hispanic/Latino identification even more so than their parents. More importantly, these children claim full U.S. citizenship by birthright; they are, in Berto's (age 13) words, "born in North America" and overcome the geographic logic of Hispanic/Latino identification in this way.

16 When the linguistic and geographic logics are overcome in the second generation, it is the racial logic of Hispanic/Latino external identification that remains (Marrow 2003: 453–4).

17 For starting references on some of the different conceptions of race throughout Latin America, see Domínguez (1994), Harris (1964), and Wade (1997).

18 See, for example, Beserra (2005) on the potential development of "Hispanic/Latino" identity among adult Brazilians in the United States.

19 See Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2006) for a discussion of "modes of incorporation" and the different variables that affect incoming immigrant groups to determine their trajectories in the United States.

20 In the 2000 U.S. Census, the Portuguese were the largest immigrant group in Massachusetts (at 8.6% of the state's foreign-born population), followed closely by Dominicans (6.0%), Canadians (5.2%), PRC Chinese (5.1%), Brazilians (4.7%), and some Latin American and Caribbean-origin groups (4.4% Haitian, 2.4% Salvadoran, 2.0% Colombian, 1.7% Guatemalan, and 1.7% Jamaican). In contrast, in Brazilians' other three principal destination

states—California, New York, and Florida—both the foreign-born Portuguese and Brazilian populations are less significant, while foreign-born Latin American and Caribbean-origin immigrant groups figure much more prominently. For instance, in 2000 California's foreign-born population is 44.3% Mexican, 4.1% Salvadoran, and 2.4% Guatemalan (but only 0.3% Brazilian and 0.4% Portuguese). New York's foreign-born population is 10.5% Dominican, 5.9% Jamaican, 4.2% Mexican, 3.7% Guyanese, 3.6% Ecuadorian, 3.2% Haitian, 2.9% Colombian, 2.5% Trinidadian/Tobagan, and 1.1% Peruvian (but only 0.6% Brazilian and 0.3% Portuguese). Florida's foreign-born population is 24.1% Cuban, 7.1% Mexican, 6.8% Haitian, 5.9% Colombian, 5.3% Jamaican, 3.7% Nicaraguan, 2.5% Dominican, and 1.8% Venezuelan (but only 1.7% Brazilian and 0.2% Portuguese) (http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/statemap.cfm).

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